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LAW AND WAR IN THE VIRTUAL ERA
By Jack M. Beard*
Since the first attempts by states to use law to regulate armed conflict, legal constraints have
often failed to protect civilians from the adverse effects of war. Advances in military technology
have usually not improved this situation and have instead made law even more distant and less
relevant to the suffering of civilians in wartime.1 The massive, indiscriminate incendiary
bombing campaigns against major urban areas in World War II spoke volumes about the irrelevance of fundamental legal principles and rules designed to protect civilian populations in
wartime. Law and lawyers were in fact far removed, physically and operationally, from the
cockpits of the United States bombers flying over Tokyo, whose aircrews were focused on surviving their missions. They struggled with limited information about their assigned targets and
conducted their operations with rudimentary preflight instructions that directed them, for
example, to avoid destroying the palace of the Japanese emperor but left them free to submerge
entire residential areas of the city in a sea of flames.
Fifty-six years after the war with Japan, the United States began a military campaign against
a new enemy, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In contrast to World War II and the human
aircrews over Japan, this war on its first night found a robot, the Predator MX-1 (an unmanned
aerial vehicle, or UAV), surveilling the roads leading out of that country’s capital city, Kabul.
The Predator was equipped with missiles that could be fired by a crew thousands of miles away
in the United States controlling the vehicle via a satellite link. It appeared to have an opportunity to kill the fleeing leader of the Taliban regime, Mullah Omar, together with his closest
cohorts. The legal office at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reportedly raised various
concerns about the air strike, including the likelihood that it would cause excessive civilian
casualties, and the attack was aborted.2
The aborted 2001 Predator attack over Kabul involved a previously unimaginable level of
safety for the faraway crew conducting the attack, an aircraft that could “loiter” over targets
* Professorial Lecturer, UCLA School of Law; former Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs),
Department of Defense. The author was also assigned as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve to the
International and Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army.
He greatly appreciates comments by David Koplow and Stephen Yeazell on earlier drafts and also thanks
Daniel Laidman for research assistance.
1
For example, long-range artillery, aircraft, and missiles each dramatically expanded the battlefield and in so
doing threatened ever-increasing numbers of civilians, greatly complicating compliance with practices or rules
obliging military forces to distinguish combatants from noncombatants.
2
See REBECCA GRANT, THE AFGHAN AIR WAR 17 (Air Force Association Special Report, 2002), available at
http://www.afa.org/media/reports/afghanbook/Afghanbk.pdf; Evan Thomas & Daniel Klaidman, The Battle
Within, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 40; Seymour Hersh, King’s Ransom: How Vulnerable Are the Saudi Royals?
NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2001, at 35. Ultimately, the decision whether the convoy could be fired upon by the CIAoperated Predator had to be made by the commander in chief of CENTCOM, as advised by CENTCOM Judge Advocate General officers.
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unimpeded by the limits of human pilots, and an extraordinary level of legal review for an air
strike in progress. The attack thus demonstrates several key aspects of a new era of warfare made
possible by recent advances in remotely controlled or semiautomated “virtual” military technologies.3 This article examines the way these virtual technologies are purposely expanding
important military capabilities while unintentionally transforming modern military operations, military information resources, the structure of military organizations, and the role of
lawyers within these organizations. Unanticipated applications of virtual military capabilities
are creating unprecedented levels of transparency and are unexpectedly making international
law more relevant than ever to armed conflicts. This new relevance especially bears on longignored or easily manipulated legal principles and rules that bar attacks on legitimate military
targets if those attacks are likely to result in excessive or disproportionate civilian casualties.
Such principles and rules are now gaining unheard-of traction and renewed meaning as the
new—and very real—virtual era dawns.
Part I of this article briefly examines the rise of virtual military technologies and assesses their
transformational extrahuman capabilities, which now enable military forces to conduct “persistent surveillance.” Part II describes the transformational aspects of “virtual distance” associated with these new technologies and contrasts them with the characteristics of conventional
notions of distance associated with manned military vehicles and platforms. This part next analyzes the way these virtual technologies are intentionally changing warfare while their informational capabilities and other attributes are unintentionally changing the missions and operations of military forces and the structure and culture of military institutions. The importance
of these new technologies ultimately extends beyond new missions and capabilities to encompass fundamental changes in hierarchical military structures and even the definition of victory
in war itself.
Part III examines how the extrahuman capabilities of virtual technologies and aspects of virtual distance in weaponry are unexpectedly revitalizing key jus in bello principles of the law of
war4 that protect civilians from the effects of hostilities, facilitating their emergence as more
serious constraints on military operations. Part III also shows how this new “law of virtual war”
3
While the term “virtual” was once used in common parlance only to describe something imaginary—and in
the military context has often been associated with computer-simulated war games or simulated “virtual reality”
training techniques—it is now increasingly used as well to encompass and describe a wide variety of technologically
assisted remote operations of real activities. The new era of virtual offices and classrooms, in which humans work
on projects by proxy or at a distance, and virtual equipment, such as fences that function through networks of towermounted sensors and surveillance gear, can now appropriately be said to include military operations that rely on
a growing assortment of vehicles, platforms, and weapons controlled, managed, and directed by personnel at distant
sites. For purposes of this article, “virtual military technologies” comprise nonexpendable and remotely controlled
or semiautonomous weapons systems, robots, naval craft, and ground and aerial vehicles. They do not include ballistic or semiballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery projectiles, and precision-guided munitions (which are also
excluded from the definition of “UAVs” by the U.S. military).
4
Jus in bello refers to that part of the law of war governing the conduct of armed conflicts. In its modern
form, the law of war can also be referred to as the “law of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law.”
U.S. law, such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, contains important references to the law of war,
ensuring that this older term will continue to require the attention of scholars who will interpret it consistently
with growing commentary linked to the more contemporary term “international humanitarian law.” The Supreme
Court, when forced to opine on the subject, has concluded that the term “law of war” includes at a minimum “the
four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949,” and must be read consistently with the “rules and precepts of the law
of nations” as applied in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942). See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613
(2006).
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continues to be informed by the increasingly common fusion of human and machine in sophisticated weapons systems and how these advanced technologies are adding new responsibilities
to the duty to take precautionary measures. Part IV concludes with some observations on the
future of virtual military technologies and the law of war.
I. THE DAWN OF THE VIRTUAL ERA
The Relentless Pursuit of New Military Technology and Its Unintended Consequences
Historically, the possibility that conflicts between states will be conducted by force has led
to intense competition by states “in the arts and the instruments of force.”5 It is thus not surprising that the most industrialized countries have been preoccupied, especially since 1939,
with achieving military-technological improvements and have devoted enormous amounts of
funding to military-related research-and-development projects.6 It is in this context that some
scholars suggest that military science has mobilized society, as seen by the way that military
projects and a military-related agenda dominate the work of engineers and scientists, particularly in the United States.7
The U.S. military-technological experience represents a consistent, but exaggerated, variation of historical trends in this area, as Americans have displayed an almost boundless confidence in the power of science and technology to promote “progress” and have tended to trust
in the power of military technology to translate into success in war.8 This fundamental belief
in the power of military-technological achievements does not mean, however, that decision
makers in the United States— or in any other industrialized country—feel compelled to give
careful consideration to the overall ramifications of such achievements before pursuing them.
Technological advances can actually occur with little deliberation about their long-term consequences, and the implications of all the potential applications of new weapons systems may
therefore be largely unforeseen.9 The relentless pursuit of new military technology, in conjunction with the militarization of science in modern society, also means that scientific and technological developments are now more likely than ever to be quickly applied to warfare.10 This
5
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 127 (1979). This competition is heightened
by the inherently relative nature of military power and the high-stakes security environment, which makes states
believe that there is little room left for error. See Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 173,
173–74 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
6
See Donald A. MacKenzie & Judy Wajcman, Introduction to pt. 4, Technological Determinism and Weaponry,
in SOCIAL SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY 343 (Donald A. MacKenzie & Judy Wajcman eds., 2d ed. 1999).
7
CHRIS H. GRAY, POSTMODERN WAR: THE NEW POLITICS OF CONFLICT 231 (1997) (noting that as many
as half of all engineers and scientists in the United States are working for the military or on military problems, or
otherwise working in accord with military priorities).
8
See, e.g., Evan Thomas & John Barry, War’s New Science, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1991, at 38 (“Americans have
always looked to science for their answers, in war as in everything else.”). Some have suggested that the U.S. attachment to new military technology even borders on “technophilia.” E.g., MANUEL DE LANDA, WAR IN THE AGE
OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 29, 225 (1991).
9
Such unintended consequences may arise in a variety of contexts, including the proliferation of new weapons
in the hands of enemy states or nonstate actors, resulting changes in the ways wars are waged, commercial spin-offs
of technologies that were once monopolized by the military, and unforeseen applications of new technologies.
10
This phenomenon stands in contrast to the less prominent role that science played in warfare in some earlier
societies. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 7, at 231 (noting that wheels were used on toys for hundreds of years before
they were used on chariots and that gunpowder was used for fireworks in China long before it was used to revolutionize warfare).
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rapid deployment of new military technologies increases the possibility that scientific and technological advances may ironically yield results that ultimately diminish, rather than enhance,
the power of states seeking military advantage through the acquisition of these weapons
systems.
The Road to Virtual Weapons Systems
Driven by various institutional, strategic, monetary, and practical objectives (and not
mainly by humanitarian considerations), the U.S. military has long endeavored to achieve
more accurate bombing capabilities.11 These efforts led to the development and deployment
of a variety of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that became prominent in the Persian Gulf
war of 1991. The introduction of PGMs and other “high-tech” weapons intensified the search
for new technology to obtain more and better supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data for targeting. In the security environment that followed the events of
September 11, 2001, new U.S. strategic priorities further emphasized the need for expanded
ISR capabilities, particularly to realize the key operational goal of “[d]eny[ing] enemies sanctuary by developing capabilities for persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement.”12
Unlike conventional ISR missions, “persistent surveillance” entailed the systematic, sustained,
and real-time observation of many different areas, places, persons, and things.13 These new
information requirements called for new technological solutions.14 UAVs, which had seen
only limited use before 9/11,15 emerged as the key technological enabler for meeting the critical
persistent surveillance requirement.16
Although UAVs that now provide previously unimaginable amounts of data were deployed
on a very limited or experimental basis less than ten years ago, they have become an integral
part of U.S. military operations and are increasingly being produced, deployed, and in many
11
A bomb that could improve the likelihood of achieving a one-shot, one-kill ratio not only would be a bargain,
but also would increase the capability to destroy hard targets and reduce the number of sorties required for any one
mission. It would further mean that weapons could be released from safer distances and altitudes. See STEPHEN
BUDIANSKY, AIR POWER: THE MEN, MACHINES, AND IDEAS THAT REVOLUTIONIZED WAR, FROM KITTY
HAWK TO GULF WAR II 408 – 09 (2004).
12
DONALD H. RUMSFELD, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 3, available
at http://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr2002/index.htm.
13
Robert K. Ackerman, Persistent Surveillance Comes into View, SIGNAL MAG., May 2002, at 18 (quoting a
senior official in the Department of Defense on how persistent surveillance highlights the difference between the
information needs of the intelligence community (which may be inclined toward “every so often”) and those of the
military (which generally is looking for “whatever ‘now’ is defined as”)).
14
While satellites are adequate for certain intelligence purposes, they provide coverage of specific locations for
intermittent periods only. U-2 spy planes and other manned high-altitude aircraft provide more extended surveillance coverage but are limited by the risks they pose to pilots and human limits that constrain the number and length
of required missions.
15
Israel demonstrated how UAVs could perform critical and dangerous ISR missions by using them in 1982 to
identify Syrian antiaircraft batteries and monitor Syrian airfields. BUDIANSKY, supra note 11, at 404 – 05. Limited
U.S. deployments of UAVs over Bosnia in 1995 and in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 further demonstrated these
capabilities.
16
Ackerman, supra note 13, at 18. A growing array of UAVs is making this requirement a reality. For example,
the Predator has been supplemented by the RQ-4A Global Hawk, which can operate at higher altitudes, remain
aloft for up to thirty-six hours, and survey an area of forty thousand square miles using high-resolution Synthetic
Aperture Radar and electro-optical/infrared sensors. See Global Hawk to Fly over Canada in January, AEROSPACE
DAILY & DEF. REP., Dec. 15, 1999.

2009]

LAW AND WAR IN THE VIRTUAL ERA

413

cases exported by a growing number of other states.17 The use of such virtual military technology continues to grow at an astounding pace; the scope of unmanned missions and capabilities keeps on expanding; and the worldwide demand for UAVs, led by the United States,
is dramatically rising each year.18 The ability of UAVs to linger over targets for extended periods of time in perilous conditions illustrates one of the reasons for the attractiveness of virtual
technologies to military planners in the United States and elsewhere: they give the human operator a virtual working environment while they perform the dirty, dull, or dangerous missions.19
Virtual technologies that can engage in such missions are not limited to UAVs, but also encompass new and varied land and sea applications designed to support key emerging missions, such
as the detection and disarming of roadside explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan by
unmanned ground vehicles and robots.20 The U.S. Congress in particular has been eager to
sustain and advance this conversion to virtual technologies, and in 2001 mandated that a full
third of essential U.S. military aircraft and ground combat vehicles be unmanned by 2015.21
These weapons systems, especially UAVs, are playing an increasingly significant role in the military operations of more and more countries.22
II. THE EFFECT OF VIRTUAL TECHNOLOGIES ON MILITARY OPERATIONS
AND INSTITUTIONS
Although virtual military technologies are ideally suited for so-called dirty, dull, or dangerous missions, two more fundamental dimensions or aspects of these technologies help explain
their transformational effects on military institutions, military operations, and the law of war:
the new “virtual distance” that they create between humans and the battlefield, and their new
virtual “extrahuman” capabilities. The U.S. military planned to use these two aspects of virtual
weapons systems to obtain both unprecedented quantities and types of ISR data for targeting,
17
See J. R. Wilson, UAV Worldwide Roundup 2009, AEROSPACE AMERICA, Apr. 2009, at 30, 30 (“The proliferation of UAVs continues to accelerate, with a growing number of companies, countries, and innovative designs
entering the market.”). As early as 2005, at least forty-one countries were operating eighty models of UAVs. OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROADMAP, 2005–2030, at 38 (2005).
18
While the United States leads the market in research and development, production, and spending, European
and Asian investment in UAVs is rapidly growing. See Larry Dickerson, New Respect for UAVs, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 26, 2009, at 94. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany lead Europe in this field, with
over ninety different aircraft or variants, from some thirty manufacturers. UAV programs are also under way in
many countries in Asia, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. “Israel
remains one of the world’s major UAV suppliers . . . .” J. R. Wilson, UAV Worldwide Roundup—2005, AEROSPACE
AMERICA, Sept. 2005, at 26, 29.
19
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 17, at 1–2.
20
Ramon Lopez, Foiling Bombs and Bad Guys, DEF. TECH. INT’L, Dec. 1, 2007, at 30 (noting that from 2004
to 2006, unmanned ground vehicles/robots increased from 160 to 4000 in Iraq and Afghanistan, performing nearly
30,000 explosive ordnance disposal missions and neutralizing more than 11,000 improvised explosive devices in
2006 alone).
21
Section 220(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat.
1654, 1654A-38 (2000), states that by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force should
be unmanned, and that by 2015, one-third of the army’s Future Combat Systems’ operational ground combat vehicles should be unmanned.
22
For example, Israel made significant use of UAVs against Hezbollah in the 2006 fighting in southern Lebanon;
Georgia used UAVs in the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict to monitor the activities of separatist forces and provide
targeting data for Georgian artillery units; and Iran has a growing inventory of UAVs and has apparently been using
some of them over Iraq. See Dickerson, supra note 18; Ned Parker, U.S. Says It Downed Iran Drone over Iraq, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at A23.
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as well as new attack capabilities. Unintended and profound consequences, however, have
accompanied the accomplishment of these objectives.
Intentional Changes: New Attack Capabilities
Although the first UAVs were used only to collect ISR data, more recently they have been
equipped with a growing array of missiles, as well as laser designators with new target acquisition capabilities; the result is new hunter-killer UAVs like the MQ-9 Reaper.23 As intended,
the extrahuman capabilities of virtual technologies have dramatically expanded attack capabilities. UAVs now not only perform persistent surveillance to identify and track targets—on
missions that may exceed the limited endurance and skills of human pilots—but also constitute
lethal weapons platforms with a continuous presence, enabling attacks on more targets in more
situations than ever before. In addition to ensuring that remotely located human pilots will not
be killed or captured, UAVs have the ability to designate targets, which means that laser-guided
bombs do not require humans to be near the target on the ground or in the air to carry out this
key function.
The problematic humanitarian and legal implications of the intended application of new
virtual weapons systems correspond with their objective: they dramatically expand the potential list of targets that can be effectively attacked. The full meaning of this new attack capability
is still unfolding, but it has clearly manifested itself to this point in at least two emerging patterns: first, UAVs have become an indispensable tool in the targeted killing of key individuals
in terrorist organizations;24 and, second, UAV capabilities now allow military forces to strike
much more comprehensive lists of key “strategic” targets. Similar questions, albeit on a more
limited scale, were raised by the emergence of PGMs in the 1990s, inspiring considerable
commentary about the consequences and significance of more precise targeting capabilities.
Although some viewed precision as potentially ushering in a new humanitarian era in armed
conflict,25 it has raised its own set of humanitarian issues. These issues, made even more salient
by virtual technologies, force states to confront some difficult and fundamental questions, for
example: What kind of persons can be specifically targeted with these weapons or, put another
way, who now constitutes a “combatant”? And what kinds of targets can legitimately be
attacked as strategic military objectives?26
23
See U.S. Air Force, MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System (Sept. 2008), at http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id⫽122; John A. Tirpak, UAVs with Bite, A.F. MAG., Jan. 2007, at 46.
24
See, e.g., Greg Miller, U.S. Strikes Stagger Al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at A1 (noting that since Aug.
31, 2008, the Central Intelligence Agency has carried out an “expansive targeted killing program” that has involved
“at least 38 Predator strikes in northwest Pakistan”); David Morgan, U.S. Targeted-Killings of Al Qaeda Suspects
Rising, REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2006. One of the first notable UAV air strikes was launched in Yemen in 2002 (by a
CIA-operated Predator). See James Risen & Judith Miller, C.I.A. Is Reported to Kill a Leader of Qaeda in Yemen,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A1.
25
See, e.g., Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 140, 141 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994) (suggesting
that the emergence of more accurate bombing capabilities might lead to a convergence of “ethics and efficiency”
that could “bolster the prospects for adherence to international norms”).
26
This question has continued to grow in importance since PGMs were used against new types of targets in the
1991 Gulf war. See Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf
War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 387, 389 (1994) (“Until the Gulf War, the definition of ‘military objective’ had never
really been tested, largely because belligerents lacked the capacity to bypass enemy forces to strike at nonmilitary
targets.”).
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The continuing efforts by lawyers in the international community to answer these two questions are complex and lie beyond the scope of this article. Opposition to the targeted killing
of individuals raises important questions, such as: Where does the “war on terror” end and
where does domestic law enforcement begin? Do national borders remain as barriers to this
type of military action or does war now exist everywhere, all the time?27 As for the type of targets
that can be counted as legitimate military objectives, a debate has raged since the 1991 Gulf
war about “effects based” targeting and the propriety of attacking various economic and industrial infrastructure sites or other strategic targets closely linked to the center of gravity of an
enemy regime and its war efforts.28 Such issues highlight how precision targeting alone has not
solved the problem of protecting civilians from the effects of hostilities and may instead be presenting new threats.29
While UAVs greatly improve the ability of military forces to identify, track, target, and then
destroy specific objectives, this significant expansion in attack capabilities is in one sense only
an incremental change in nature, since it builds upon recent major technological advances in
guided precision targeting. On the other hand, the virtual “persistent surveillance” capabilities
and new virtual operating environments for humans represent powerful, transformational
forces that can limit the full application of these new, expanded targeting capabilities. Such
unforeseen and ironic consequences begin with the effects that these new virtual technologies
have on the military organizations responsible for their operation.
Unintentional Changes
Changes in military structures and operations. The extrahuman capabilities of UAVs have
enabled the U.S. military for the first time in history to engage in persistent surveillance
over large, distant areas of the globe. Smaller versions of UAVs (as well as some unmanned
ground vehicles), which can be carried by individual soldiers and launched or set in motion
by hand, supplement these assets by acquiring real-time tactical information in areas that
might otherwise be inaccessible to their human operators.30 Thanks to these new virtual sur27
See generally Rosa E. Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in
the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004); W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law,
45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 711 (2007).
28
“Effects based targeting” seeks to identify “specific links, nodes, or objects” that, if attacked, will fulfill certain
desired objectives. Tony Montgomery, Legal Perspective from the EUCOM Targeting Cell, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL
LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 189, 190 (Naval War C. Int’l L. Stud. No. 78, Andru E. Wall ed.,
2003) [hereinafter LEGAL & ETHICAL LESSONS]. Such targeting may include attacks on a state’s strategic infrastructure that are designed to coerce a regime into complying with specific demands.
29
For example, Judge James E. Baker warned of “the impending collision among the law of armed conflict, the
doctrine of effects-based targeting, and a shared desire to limit collateral casualties and consequences to the fullest
extent possible.” James E. Baker, Judging Kosovo: The Legal Process, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Commander
in Chief, in LEGAL & ETHICAL LESSONS, supra note 28, at 7, 8. Human rights groups are rightly concerned about
the humanitarian consequences of any expansion of the definition of persons and facilities that can be legitimately
targeted in armed conflicts. See, e.g., MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR 177–93
(1991) (noting how the precise bombing of Iraq’s electrical grid in the Gulf war shut down most Iraqi water treatment plants, contributing to many civilian deaths from water-borne diseases).
30
See, e.g., David Eshel, Tiny and Unafraid: Small UAVs Fly High in Tactical Operations, DEF. TECH. INT’L, May
1, 2008, at 32, 36. Small military units can use these micro-UAVs to obtain information on what is “over the next
hill” or “around the next block.”
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veillance capabilities, military commanders now abound in more recorded and real-time information than once was even imaginable. Yet for this vast amount of new data to be effectively
used, fundamental changes in military operations and organization are necessary.
While military commanders and strategists are fond of referring to technology that provides
a perceived advantage over the enemy as a “force multiplier,” they may overlook the fact that
for such technology to be genuinely effective, it must also be viewed as a “force modifier.”31
The success of new military technologies has thus depended on how well they function in a
particular state’s military structure and operations, often requiring major corresponding
changes in organization, logistics, doctrine, strategy, and tactics. Even commentators who
emphasize the importance of military technology in so-called revolutions in military affairs
acknowledge that technical advances alone rarely make genuine revolutions.32
The vast quantities and new types of ISR data generated by virtual military technologies have
little value to military forces if they do not reach the appropriate commanders or other decision
makers in a timely manner. The use of such data remains an enormous challenge for even the
most powerful, technologically sophisticated states: linear organizational schemes or vertical
bureaucracies like those that have predominated in the U.S. military establishment are especially ill-suited to taking advantage of large amounts of new intelligence information.33
Accordingly, as long as advanced information systems associated with virtual military technologies are tied to obsolete hierarchical structures, the advantages that these systems hold out
to U.S. forces probably cannot be fully realized, if at all.34 Unlike network-centric systems
(on which terrorists and other militant groups rely in what some call “netwar”35), traditional
linear structures and processes found in most military institutions are likely to result in making
too little information available to the subordinate units that need it, while possibly producing
an overload of data at other levels—with negative consequences for all operations, especially
targeting.36
Harnessing the potential benefits of information supplied by new virtual military technologies in a way that allows individuals to draw on these resources to deal with new asymmetrical
31
JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, THE ADVENT OF NETWAR 44 (Rand, 1996). For this reason, it has
sometimes proven difficult for new weapons systems to be integrated into particular societies and their war-fighting
machines. See DE LANDA, supra note 8, at 27.
32
See MAX BOOT, WAR MADE NEW 10 (2006) (“No technical advance by itself made a revolution; it was how
people responded to technology that produced seismic shifts in warfare.”).
33
Military organizational structures often impede the effective, timely dissemination of intelligence—making
too little information available to those who need it— by forcing commanders to submit their intelligence requirements through a cumbersome system that validates, consolidates, and assigns priority to these requirements at various levels; to request authorization for the use of the necessary intelligence assets from a centralized system; and to
wait for the information to be collected, analyzed, put in usable form, and sent back through the same cumbersome
structure. See THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 192–93
(2006).
34
Id. at 193 (“[T]he premier benefit of the Information Age—immediate access to current intelligence—is
nullified by the way we route it through our vertical bureaucracy.”).
35
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 31, at 5, 44 (defining “netwar” as “an emerging mode of conflict and
crime at societal levels, involving measures short of war, in which the protagonists use—indeed, depend on using—
network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and communication”).
36
HAMMES, supra note 33, at 193 (noting that linear military bureaucracies discourage subordinate units from
accessing intelligence information directly, via the Internet, which can result in “limiting . . . the variety and timeliness of the information available to our decision makers”).
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threats thus requires the reorganization of military hierarchical structures related to the collection, processing, and dissemination of such data; major cultural adjustments; and fundamental changes in planning, doctrine, and operations.37 Key network-oriented reforms must
be implemented if military commanders are to take advantage of the “unblinking eye” capability of virtual technologies. Such reforms include creating adaptive networks so that commanders at all levels can directly access both important real-time information38 and the results
of prolonged surveillance of specific targets. In the context of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this kind of change is contributing to what has been called
a “significant metamorphosis of intelligence operations.” As part of this metamorphosis, the
“decentralized control of intelligence assets” has become a key tenet of emerging COIN doctrine.39 This radically expanded control of new intelligence assets also reflects the key COIN
concept that “higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as
possible down to their level.”40 While the effects of the surge in U.S. combat troops in Iraq have
been widely noted, it can be argued that another, more transformational “surge” occurred in
the increased and highly successful use by subordinate ground forces of new intelligence capabilities, especially the full motion video provided by UAVs.41
The new virtual technologies and the capacity for persistent surveillance have given unprecedented intelligence capabilities to U.S. and allied military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as to military commanders in a growing number of countries. Just as this information continues to lead inescapably to fundamental changes in the structure and operations of military
organizations, so it is also reshaping the capability of military commanders and their advisers
to comply with law-of-war obligations, while unexpectedly transforming the work of lawyers
and other personnel who are responsible for planning and approving attacks that may cause
incidental civilian casualties.
Personnel changes. Modern warfare, as practiced by powerful states like the United States, is
managed by professionals in vast and complex bureaucracies. Major technological changes that
spawn new methods of warfare and related organizational changes often pose significant personnel challenges to these bureaucracies. One component that is profoundly affected by the
new types of information generated by these technologies—one that plays a key role in ensuring compliance with law-of-war obligations and preventing civilian casualties—is the lawyers.
37
Ackerman, supra note 13, at 20; Joris Janssen Lok, Empty Battlefield; Commanders Urge New Tactics to Prevail
in Asymmetric Campaigns, DEF. TECH. INT’L, May 1, 2007, at 12.
38
American ground troops are increasingly equipped with laptops so they can access networks to download realtime video from UAVs operating overhead; according to the commander of one Predator squadron, they “want
more and more of it.” Charles J. Hanley, Unmanned Reapers Bound for Iraq, Afghanistan, A.F. TIMES, July 17, 2007,
at http://www.airforcetimes.com.
39
Raymond T. Odierno [now commanding general, Multinational Force–Iraq], Nichoel E. Brooks, &
Francesco P. Mastracchio, ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theatre, 50 JOINT FORCES Q. 51, 52 (2008).
40
Id.; THE U.S. ARMY–MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 47 (U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3–24, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL].
41
See Greg Miller & Julian E. Barnes, Special Drones Pursue Militias, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008, at A1 (discussing the use against extremists in Pakistan of UAVs “equipped with sophisticated new surveillance systems that
were instrumental in crippling the insurgency in Iraq”); Odierno, Brooks, & Mastracchio, supra note 39, at 53 (discussing the successful use in Iraq of a “new ISR model” that involves the allocation and apportionment of full motion
video assets that offer ground commanders greater flexibility and accessibility to information); Walter Pincus, Gadgets That Collect Information Are Also Gathering Success, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A18 (suburban ed.) (“‘ISR’
has become the new silver bullet in counterinsurgency.”).
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The information produced by virtual technologies enters a war-fighting bureaucracy increasingly dominated by the work of large, active, and varied groups of military and civilian
lawyers. Laws, rules, and regulations pervade almost every aspect of the modern U.S. military
institution and also form an integral part of the complex military social system, essential for its
discipline and operations.42 Consistently with the view of some scholars that war itself has
evolved into a legal institution, lawyers have predictably become a common fixture in all of its
dimensions.43 Although lawyers have always participated in the nation’s military operations,
U.S. military lawyers (and their modern civilian legal counterparts in the Department of
Defense) assumed a particularly prominent role in the 1991 Gulf war.44 Since then, the armed
services have embedded lawyers throughout the military establishment, from planning cells to
command posts.45 This practice, which reflects a greater degree of legal review of military activities than ever before, has become routinized and codified in a multitude of regulations, such
as a Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction directing that “all operation plans . . . , concept plans,
rules of engagement, execute orders, deployment orders, policies, and directives are [to be]
reviewed by the command legal adviser to ensure compliance with domestic and international
law.”46
The Kosovo conflict of 1999, a military operation in which NATO relied exclusively on air
power, marked an important new stage in the increasing prominence and influence of lawyers
in armed conflict. This prominence was both confirmed and sharply criticized by some commentators who argued that “NATO lawyers constrained even the preparation of options for
decisive combat” and that in their most extreme alleged actions, NATO’s lawyers “became, in
effect, [NATO’s] tactical commanders.”47 Since the Kosovo conflict, the direct involvement
of lawyers in military operations has further expanded, reflecting emerging trends in the legalization of war, the greater complexity of military-civic operations, the rising appreciation by
commanders of the utility of legal support in their multidimensional missions, and, as discussed below, the growing use of law as a strategic asset. All these factors have contributed to
the forward deployment of lawyers in ever-increasing numbers.48 The virtual era, however,
inaugurated an entirely new type of “forward deployment” for lawyers.
One key aspect of virtual distance from the battlefield is the corresponding proximity of virtual military operations to headquarters. While the pilots of conventional manned aircraft
could communicate with their superiors who, in turn, could communicate with senior policy
42
See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 33 (2006) (further observing that “[w]arfare has become rule and
regulation”).
43
Id. at 13– 45.
44
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
607 n.31 (1992) (noting that lawyers provided advice on legal issues at every level of command in all phases of
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm); Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving
Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts 16 (Nov. 19, 2001) (paper presented at Harvard University,
Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Workshop), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/
Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.
45
Dunlap, supra note 44, at 16.
46
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01A, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program, para. 6(c)(5) (Aug. 27, 1999).
47
Richard K. Betts, Compromised Command; Inside NATO’s First War, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 126, 130.
48
During the 1991 Gulf war, the U.S. Army alone deployed more than two hundred lawyers in the theater of
operation, a significantly higher per capita deployment than in either the Vietnam War or World War II. See Steven
Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 52, 54.
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officials and lawyers, the crew operating a UAV is much more easily connected with, and thus
effectively closer to, headquarters. In this sense, virtual technology is radically advancing an
important trend in modern military technology: facilitating “the ability for all levels of authority to scrutinize and to involve themselves in the battle itself.”49
The improved access to higher-level policy scrutiny afforded by virtual technologies may be
complemented by additional time for the consideration of targets (because of the comparatively longer time that UAVs may loiter over targets) and the greater possibility of meaningful
legal reviews at all levels of authority. Where now is the lawyer’s client? The distant, relatively
inaccessible cockpit of conventional, manned attack aircraft has given way to a trailer or compartment in a less restrictive, virtual environment at a secure U.S. military or intelligence facility linked to lawyers throughout the command structure. This situation probably puts a lawyer
advising on targeting decisions in a considerably better position to provide meaningful and
timely counsel. Incidents such as the aborted 2001 UAV attack on Mullah Omar vividly illustrate the expanding and sometimes controversial contours of legal oversight made possible by
virtual technologies. Some senior officials in the Bush administration are said later to have
strongly criticized the handling of the UAV attack on Mullah Omar and the role that lawyers
played in the effort.50 Notwithstanding the frustrations that individual military and civilian
officials may express at the increasingly direct role that lawyers play in U.S. military operations,
virtual technology is likely to continue to ensure the closer involvement of lawyers in the planning and execution of many attacks.
The emerging, unintended consequences of the ubiquitous information generated by the
new virtual surveillance capabilities are momentous for both military commanders and their
lawyers. Lawyers in military and government bureaucracies can be expected to perceive that
persons may be held accountable for the knowledge imparted by new types and quantities of
information and to be concerned about the standards governing its use. From these truths the
lawyer may see, before others do, that the ubiquitous information flowing from persistent surveillance brings with it new expectations, together with unprecedented levels of transparency.
As lawyers contemplate how to discharge their duties properly and fulfill their own due diligence requirements (particularly when advising on targeting decisions), the availability of new
types of information can change the meaning of what constitutes an appropriate legal review.
In place of the limited, sporadic information issued by satellites and manned aircraft, virtual
technologies can supply lawyers and planners with data that encompass all visible activities
around a target on a continuous basis. The same “unblinking eye” that enables persistent surveillance of a target long before an attack can thus capture, albeit not as its intended purpose,
the presence at that site of civilians that would be endangered by any planned attack.
49
Scott A. Cooper, The Politics of Airstrikes: Why Generals Distrust Politicians, and Vice Versa, POL’Y REV.,
June/July 2001, at 55, 58.
50
Hersh, supra note 2, at 40 (reporting that “[d]ays afterward, top Administration officials were still seething
about the incident” and that the failure left Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld “kicking a lot of glass and breaking doors”). Although Secretary Rumsfeld would later deny that lawyers were responsible for the aborted attack,
he soon coincidentally tried without success to impose a significant reduction in the number of lawyers in uniform.
See MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 121 (2005); David Rennie, Bush Orders Shoot to Kill on Terrorists; CIA Is Given
Secret List of 24 Enemy Targets, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 16, 2002, at 1. This action was consistent, however, with one of Secretary Rumsfeld’s previously expounded rules of life and good government: “Reduce the number of lawyers. They are like beavers—they get in the middle of the stream and dam it up.” Donald Rumsfeld, Manager’s Journal: Rumsfeld’s Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at A26.
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While the content of new virtually provided information has important ramifications, the
possible presence of such data also has profound and unintended consequences. These consequences extend to activities before, during, and after an attack. The availability of more relevant
information entails new responsibilities for obtaining and properly using it in planning an
attack. Furthermore, although lawyers and others involved in reviewing or planning attacks
might once have accepted many limits on their ability to access potentially relevant data, the
network-centric intelligence systems spawned by new virtual operational requirements will
presumably raise not only the accessibility of such data, but also the expectation of receiving
it throughout the military structure. Prior to authorizing an attack, lawyers, planners, and commanders nowadays must consider the unprecedented new video record that may be created,
especially if an attack risks harm to civilians and is likely to be scrutinized later. During the
operation, the possibility that an attack may need to be suspended because of changes in the
attack scenario (including the sudden detection of civilians at or near the target) will be dramatically increased by the same virtual surveillance that makes the attack itself possible. Pilots
and aircrews are not immune from concerns in this area, since their actions may be recorded
by the same intelligence assets used to facilitate their targeting.51
After an attack, virtual technologies are making many military operations more transparent
by radically expanding a process that began in earnest during the 1991 Gulf war when U.S.
officials first showed video footage of attacks from the bomb cameras on PGMs. Since only a
small fraction of the bombs used in the Gulf war were actually PGMs, the selected bomb-camera video footage was shown at Defense Department briefings for demonstration and publicity
purposes. This situation started to change in 1999 during the NATO confrontation with Serbia over Kosovo, as American officials struggled to explain the basis for specific controversial
attacks and to account for collateral bomb damage. Facing intense criticism by human rights
groups and the Serbian government, U.S. and NATO officials attempted to rebut allegations
of misconduct by any means available, which led them to apply existing technological capabilities in unintended ways by systematically using bomb-camera videos to support their
counterarguments.52
At international briefings since the Kosovo conflict, U.S. officials have increasingly displayed videos and other imagery to document their version of attacks, alleged enemy actions,
and various other incidents. For example, U.S. officials recently used videos to help make their
case with respect to an alleged Iranian provocation of a U.S. warship in the Straits of Hormuz,
the alleged presence of North Korean workers at a reportedly nuclear facility in Syria, and the
accidental shooting of twelve Pakistani soldiers allegedly mistaken for Taliban militants in the
51
For pilots and aircrews, virtually provided surveillance may add immeasurably to the underappreciated burdens of accountability that were introduced by PGM bomb-camera videos. See Cooper, supra note 49, at 58 –59
(quoting the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe during the Kosovo conflict: “Here we put this young man
in this situation where he knows that this bomb is enroute to the target, and the videotape that is recording in
the cockpit is running, that an hour after he leaves that tape is going to be graded by the Commander of the
United States Air Forces in Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and probably the President of the
United States.”).
52
During the Kosovo conflict U.S. officials ultimately became so focused on the need for effective public relations and accountability measures that, for the first time in any armed conflict, an active archive of MPEG image
files was established and made available on the Internet; it contained bomb-camera videos of NATO air strikes,
organized chronologically by specific target designations. The video record remains online. See NATO’s Role in
Kosovo: Video, at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/video.htm.
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mountainous region near the Afghan border (as recorded by a UAV flying overhead).53 The
introduction of virtual surveillance capabilities dramatically increases the pressure on states to
deploy information to rebut accusations of misconduct on the part of their military forces.
By failing to come forward with information to support its account of events, a government
with such capabilities is more likely than ever to face criticism and inspire doubts about its
claims, whether or not such information actually exists. This new level of expected transparency for military operations was embodied in requests by news organizations to the U.S. Air
Force for UAV-generated video coverage of various attacks involving U.S. forces in Iraq; these
requests were granted and resulted in the posting on Internet news sites of portions of the
requested footage.54
The effects of these rising public expectations and greater levels of transparency are unfolding as the new virtual surveillance systems are being widely deployed for the first time in history.
While this process continues, lawyers, attack planners, and military commanders are grappling
with their new responsibilities. One measure of these developments that also reflects how the
war-fighting bureaucracy of a powerful state like the United States comes to terms with the
grim prospect of civilian deaths, political pressures, legal constraints, and the ever-increasing
scrutiny of a legalized and humanized international society is a set of documents referred to as
“Rules of Engagement.”55 It is here that key policy, legal, and operational interests are balanced
and many important targeting restrictions are established.56 Lawyers already play a prominent
part in the development of these rules,57 but the increasing transparency of military operations
made possible by virtual technologies and the likelihood that more military operations will ultimately have to be explained and defended will further elevate their role and the level of scrutiny
they may apply. Even now, lawyers, in advising attack planners, often take a broad view of
potential humanitarian considerations and propose restraints on operations that go far beyond
more permissive rules of engagement.58 These restrictions have sometimes constrained U.S.
forces in ways that enemy action could not have done, particularly when public opinion has
been a crucial factor.59
53
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thom Shanker, Bush Castigates Iran, Calling Naval Confrontation ‘Provocative Act,’
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008, at A10; David Sanger, Video Links North Koreans to Syria Reactor, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2008, at A14; Jane Perlez, Pakistani Fury over Airstrikes Imperils Training, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008,
at A5.
54
The U.S. Air Force released ten UAV video clips in response to requests from various television networks and
CNN displayed portions of the clips. See New Videos Show Predators at Work in Iraq, CNN.COM (Feb. 9, 2005),
at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/08/predator.video/index.html.
55
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS ( Joint Staff Pub. 1-02,
as amended through Mar. 17, 2009) (defining rules of engagement as “[d]irectives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered”).
56
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR OPERATIONS 31–32
(Rand, 2000).
57
Dunlap, supra note 44, at 16.
58
See KENNEDY, supra note 42, at 105 (“In some instances, the modern military’s own internal rules of engagement are stricter than what traditional law in war requires. In the last years, moreover, we have seen military
professionals among those most disturbed by the Bush administration’s efforts to shrink or skirt humanitarian standards in their war on terror.”).
59
See, e.g., WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR 444 (2001) (noting that restrictive rules of engagement
in the 1999 Kosovo conflict meant that “[t]he weight of public opinion was doing to us what the Serb air defense
system had failed to do: limit our strikes”); MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS’
WAR 326 (1994) (noting that in the aftermath of the controversial bombing of the Al Firdos bunker in the 1991
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Aside from parts of rules of engagement that may be classified, their publicly available contents over the last several years serve as a barometer of progressively rising constraints on U.S.
military operations imposed by social, political, diplomatic, and legal pressures.60 Virtual technologies are both enlarging the role of lawyers and accelerating a process in which restrictive
interpretations of the law of war may be becoming the minimum acceptable standard in the
rules for attacks that risk civilian damage and injury. The capability provided by virtual technology to strike more targets and perform more missions thus comes at an unexpected and, for
some military leaders, highly problematic cost: some of the most restrictive air-strike protocols
and rules of engagement of all time.61 These developments are also fundamentally linked to the
contribution that the informational capabilities of virtual technologies are making to the contemporary concept of what constitutes victory in modern counterinsurgency operations.
Mission changes: redefining victory. The informational capabilities and new levels of transparency generated by virtual technologies operate in an international community that views
international law as increasingly relevant to armed conflicts and civilian casualties as increasingly unacceptable. In this environment, virtual weapons systems can be seen as one reason for
redefining victory in war. This new definition can be summed up in the simple formula now
found in the latest version of the U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual:
“Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War.”62
Recent conflicts have continued to demonstrate to U.S. military and political leaders how
allies and coalitions can be highly sensitive to perceived law-of-war and human rights violations
and how such violations can undermine legitimacy, adversely affecting the “soft power” on
which the leadership of many international cooperative activities depends.63 Shocking images
of the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib by U.S. military personnel preceded major
changes in official COIN policies years, sadly, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and only after
much damage had been done.64 These new policies state, for example, that the “[a]buse of
detained persons is immoral, illegal, and unprofessional” and, citing the French experience in
Algeria, conclude that the official condoning of torture leads to a loss of moral legitimacy.65
Gulf war, the air force concluded that “the political fallout from the Al Firdos raid had accomplished what the Iraqi
air defenses could not: downtown Baghdad was to be attacked sparingly, if at all”).
60
WAXMAN, supra note 56, at 31.
61
Mark Benjamin, When Is an Accidental Civilian Death Not an Accident? SALON.COM, July 30, 2007
(quoting a NATO spokesman on the adoption of a highly restrictive “zero tolerance” policy on civilian casualties
in preplanned strikes in Afghanistan). Unfortunately, because of the subsequent resurgence of the Taliban in 2008,
NATO greatly increased the use of air strikes in Afghanistan, reversing a trend in which civilian casualties had been
declining and predictably endangering support for the NATO presence there. See Carlotta Gall, Afghan President
Assails U.S.-Led Airstrike That He Says Killed 95, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at A6. These developments have contributed to a dramatic increase in the NATO forces’ demand for UAVs and critical UAV surveillance capabilities.
See David Ignatius, What a Surge Can’t Solve in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2008, at B7 (noting that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has pushed for a major increase in ISR assets in Afghanistan); Anna Mulrine, Drones
Fill the Troops Gap in Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 25, 2008, at 30.
62
U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL, supra note 40, at 252.
63
Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AJIL 689, 695 (2004)
(“Unless U.S. foreign policy and actions in the ‘war on terror’ are seen by its own citizens and other nations as legitimate and in compliance with broadly accepted legal and moral standards, they may fail to gain domestic and international support.”).
64
Id.
65
U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL, supra note 40, at 251–52. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine now emphasizes that
international legal standards, including those found in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, are applicable
to the treatment of all detainees. Id. at 352. The manual further observes that by condoning torture in the Algerian
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Because of similar concerns about the effects of images of dead and wounded civilians, U.S. forces
fighting in Iraq also waged their own aggressive “information war” regarding alleged law-of-war
violations; in some cases these concerns even dictated the targets of U.S. military operations.66
Incidental civilian casualties caused by U.S. attacks threaten the legitimacy of these military
operations on a fundamental level, especially when humanitarian motives are invoked as a basis
for U.S. intervention. By making such casualties more avoidable and thus even less politically
acceptable, virtual technologies are helping to redefine success in warfare by underpinning U.S.
policies that increasingly restrict the use of air strikes in COIN operations whenever civilian
lives are threatened. Such policies underlie a new official “mind-set” about proportionality that
“goes beyond the adherence to the rules of engagement.”67 While air strikes may be useful and
permitted by the rules of engagement, the U.S. military establishment has been forced to recognize that an attack causing incidental harm to civilians potentially “turns people against the
host-nation (HN) government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory.”68
Fortunately, the ISR capabilities that have dramatically improved the surveillance of targets for
the purpose of air strikes have also made it possible to conduct new types of ground operations—resembling the maneuvers of special operations forces—that result in fewer overall
casualties and more effective action against important insurgent or terrorist leaders.69 In addition, the effectiveness of such operations, in contrast to air strikes that may cause much more
extensive civilian casualties, helps explain recent changes in official U.S. COIN doctrine cautioning against the use of aerial bombing in many situations.70
While the law of war has always been accorded respect by U.S. military commanders and
has long been incorporated into U.S. military training and doctrine,71 it has assumed even
greater importance in modern conflicts involving terrorists, insurgents, and other militant
groups, even if those groups choose to ignore laws and humanitarian principles and instead
focus on provoking their enemies and hiding among civilians. U.S. COIN doctrine now
conflict, France “degraded the ethical climate throughout the French Army,” made the French “extremely vulnerable to enemy propaganda,” and contributed to the ultimate French defeat. Id. at 252.
66
Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Robert F. Worth, G.I.’s Open Attack to Take Falluja from Iraq Rebels, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2004, at A1 (“This time around, the American military intends to fight its own information war, countering
or squelching what has been one of the insurgents’ most potent weapons.”). In their attempt to reclaim the city of
Fallujah, U.S. forces put priority on securing the main hospital because it had become “the source of rumors about
heavy casualties.” Id.
67
U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL, supra note 40, at 249 (“Fires that cause unnecessary harm or death to noncombatants may create more resistance and increase the insurgency’s appeal— especially if the populace perceives a lack
of discrimination in their use.”); see also Adam B. Ellick, Tensions Rise As Afghans Say U.S. Raid Kills Civilians, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A26.
68
U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL, supra note 40, at 364.
69
See, e.g., Odierno, Brooks, & Mastracchio, supra note 39, at 51 (discussing these new capabilities of conventional units in Iraq made possible by the sudden increase in ISR assets and the delegation down to brigade combat
teams of the analysis and exploitation of those assets).
70
U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL, supra note 40, at 364 – 65 (listing numerous conditions and noting that “[e]ven
when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works
to the insurgents’ benefit”).
71
See W. Hays Parks, Teaching the Law of War, ARMY LAW, June 1987, at 4, 5 (noting the positive role that the
law of war can play in maintaining discipline and efficiently employing U.S. forces, and how violations may increase
enemy resistance and have other negative effects on the accomplishment of missions). Defense Department policy
thus provides that “[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts,
however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” U.S. Dep’t of Defense, DoD Law
of War Program, DoD Directive 2311.01E, §4.1 (May 9, 2006).
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emphasizes that legitimacy and the law of war play an essential role in these conflicts and that
“[b]oth insurgents and counterinsurgents are fighting for the support of the populace.”72
Acknowledging that U.S. operations will be measured against applicable international legal
standards, U.S. COIN doctrine provides new opportunities for international law to serve as a
basis for U.S. forces to engage with the civilian population.73 The new relevance of international law has not been lost on terrorist groups and rogue states, even if they do not observe it:
such groups and governments use new informational technologies to exploit images of dead
civilians and other evidence of alleged law-of-war violations as part of a growing practice that
some describe as “lawfare.”74
Although most military theorists once viewed law as largely irrelevant to war, the political and moral legitimacy of military operations is increasingly linked to the observance of
legal obligations, particularly those related to protection of the civilian population.75 The
United States has, sometimes inadvertently, had a hand in these developments. During the
1991 Gulf war, U.S. military forces used international law as a “strategic asset,” conspicuously
describing actions and objectives in legal terms and seeking to endow operations with the
legitimacy of international law.76 Multinational coalitions, viewed as conferring their own
legitimacy on U.S. actions, were built on this basis as well.77 American officials have learned
that the single most important indicator of compliance with the law of war is the perceived
respect for rules protecting the civilian population.78 In post-9/11 conflicts, minimizing civilian casualties remains of great concern to any U.S. officials who want to maintain international
coalitions against terrorists and other enemies.
Virtual military technologies have been instrumental in making international law relevant
to armed conflicts, in part by bringing new levels of transparency to questions about the legitimacy of military operations and related notions of what constitutes victory in war. In addition,
72

U.S. COIN FIELD MANUAL, supra note 40, at 52.
While COIN doctrine encourages U.S. forces to make clear that they “do not intend to undermine or change
the local religion or traditions,” they nonetheless must find a legitimate basis for reducing “the effects of dysfunctional social practices that affect the ability to conduct effective security operations.” Id. at 219.
74
Dunlap, supra note 44, at 4. Dunlap argues that as U.S. military operations have come to depend on the legitimacy that may be provided by law, adversaries increasingly see this development “as a vulnerability to be exploited.”
Id. at 9 –10; see also CLARK, supra note 59, at 443, 8 (noting that Serbian agents in the Kosovo conflict skillfully
publicized apparent NATO law-of-war violations and that “new technologies impacted powerfully at the political
levels. The instantaneous flow of news and especially imagery could overwhelm the ability of governments to
explain, investigate, coordinate, and confirm.”).
75
See, e.g., CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 13 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Oxford 1976)
(1832) (“Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as
international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.”). International law has since become so interwoven into
the fabric of international politics that it would probably impress many of its detractors of earlier eras: it is now,
at a minimum, the type of political constraint that even Clausewitz would have respected. Id. at 252 (noting that
“war is only a branch of political activity” and that “it is in no sense autonomous”).
76
See Normand & Jochnick, supra note 26, at 393–99; see also KENNEDY, supra note 42, at 8 (describing how
the “humanist vocabulary of international law” has been “mobilized by the military as a strategic asset”).
77
One of the important lessons of the 1991 Gulf war was that the perceived compliance of U.S. military operations with the law of war was a key factor in persuading states to join and remain in the U.S.-led coalition. See
BYERS, supra note 50, at 119 –20; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR 205 (Picador 2001) (2000) (observing
that “[t]he legitimacy of [U.S.] military operations overseas depends on persuading other states to join as coalition
partners” and that “coalition warfare is increasingly seen as the future of war”).
78
See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 59, at 434 (describing the need of NATO forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict to
minimize, if not eliminate, civilian casualties as “the most pressing drumbeat of the campaign” and observing that
“each incident of accidental harm to civilians sent shock waves up and down through NATO”).
73
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some weapons have themselves come to be viewed as conveying a certain type of legitimacy.
Since virtual weapons systems are among the most prominent of the high-tech weapons now
deployed by U.S. military forces, they are linked to a battle for “high-tech legitimacy” that was
launched in an intensive U.S. public relations campaign in the 1991 Gulf war. Public statements by coalition officials during that war were often accompanied by the repetitive airing of
selected bomb-camera videos, which gave the impression of the dawning of a new era of technologically enabled compliance with the law of war and avoidance of civilian casualties.79 The
authorities consistently stressed that high-tech weapons and precision air strikes enabled
coalition forces to spare Iraqi civilians from the effects of war as much as possible.80
Years of viewing wars through selected images of PGMs hitting their intended targets have
resulted in demands by both the American and the international publics for increasingly lower
levels of civilian injuries.81 The improved targeting capabilities afforded by virtual technologies
promise to add to these expectations. Furthermore, the enhanced accuracy associated with even
more advanced high-tech weapons will make it that much harder in the new virtual courtroom
of public opinion to portray errant bombs and resulting civilian casualties as accidents.82 Boasting about technological achievements has exposed the U.S. military to calls for compliance
with ever-higher standards.83 After the 1991 Gulf war, some Air Force officials admitted that
by “overselling” its high-tech capabilities, the service had “unwittingly made itself vulnerable”
to enemy strategies portraying U.S. forces as “insensitive to [the law of armed conflict] and
human rights.”84 It is too late, however, for the United States to turn back. By portraying its
high-tech weapons in the 1991 Gulf war and afterward as broadly serving humanitarian and
international legal purposes and by intentionally using these weapons in the battle for legitimacy, the United States has imposed a burden on its virtual weapons systems. In addition to
these high-tech expectations, virtual weapons systems bring with them a new level of transparency and control that makes it much easier to determine if a state is sincere in its efforts to
achieve such legitimacy and comply with legal norms. With these innovations, they are also
bringing new meaning to the legal norms themselves.
III. THE LAW OF VIRTUAL WAR
The Existing Legal Framework
Drawing heavily on conventions and customary international law dating to the nineteenth
century, the modern law of war governing the conduct of military forces in armed conflicts (the
79
Normand & Jochnick, supra note 26, at 393 (“Most politicians and commentators welcomed what they saw
as a new paradigm in war and in law, conjuring visions of a global army using the latest military technology in the
service of international law and justice.”) (footnote omitted).
80
Id. at 394; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: AN INTERIM
REPORT TO CONGRESS 12-2, 12-3 (1991) (stating that coalition forces had “scrupulously adhered to . . . fundamental law of war proscriptions” in conducting “the most discriminate military campaign in history”).
81
WAXMAN, supra note 56, at 57–59.
82
Id. at 59; Editorial, How Precise Is Our Bombing? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at A12 (noting that “the incessant boasting about the surgical accuracy of the attacks . . . raises expectations that every bomb will hit its target—
and outrage around the world when one doesn’t”).
83
KENNEDY, supra note 42, at 8 (“[H]ow should the U.S. military itself react to the escalating public demand
that it wage war without collateral damage—or to the tendency to hold the military to an ever higher standard as
its technological capabilities increase?”).
84
Dunlap, supra note 44, at 12–13.
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jus in bello) is built on a set of general principles that give rise to specific prohibitions and
requirements. These general principles hold that (1) states are limited in the means they
may choose to conduct warfare;85 (2) humanity at all times prohibits the infliction of unnecessary suffering;86 (3) acts of violence and destruction superfluous to military necessity are
prohibited;87 and (4) the parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian and military objectives.88 From these key
general principles—limited permissible means of warfare, humanity, necessity, and distinction—flow additional principles and various specific rules and obligations.
Because key principles of the law of war proved to be highly elastic in their application
and interpretation by states involved in armed conflicts during most of the twentieth century,
an additional protocol to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 was concluded in 1977
(Protocol I) that was designed to supplement, update, and formalize legal restraints on the
means and methods of warfare to ensure more effective protection of the civilian population
in international armed conflicts.89 Although the United States is not a party to Protocol I, it
accepts many of its most important provisions as binding obligations under customary international law.90
While the multilateral effort to draft Protocol I did not proceed without controversy, it did
produce important clarifications and refinements of key law-of-war principles and specific
rules relating to protection of the civilian population. First, before one can comply with the
fundamental requirement of distinction and thus protect civilians and civilian objects from
85
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV].
86
Humanity was recognized as a fundamental principle of the law of war at the earliest stages of its development.
See St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 1 AJIL Supp. 95, 95 (1907) (declaring that the employment of arms that uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men would be “contrary to the laws of humanity”) [hereinafter St. Petersburg
Declaration]. The application of the principle of humanity was extended and reaffirmed in the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907, to which the United States is a party (the 1907 Hague Regulations, annexed to Hague IV,
supra note 85, remain among the most authoritative sources of law for the United States in its conduct of military
operations).
87
Regulations governing the U.S. Armed Forces recognize that the conduct of hostilities must be carried on
within the limits of international law, including restraints imposed by the principles of humanity and military necessity, as well as distinction and proportionality. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ch. 5 (NWP 1-14M, MCWP 5-12.1, COMDTPUB
5800.7A, 2007) [hereinafter NAVY COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK], available at http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/ild/
documents/1-14M_( July_2007)_(NWP).pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, TARGETING, app. A, at 88 –90
(A.F. Doctrine Doc. 2-1.9, June 8, 2006); U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, paras. 3(a),
41 (Field Manual 27-10, 1956).
88
The principle of distinction is fundamental to the law of war and is accepted by the United States as a binding
obligation under customary international law. See William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some
Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 323 (2003) (describing distinction as a “bedrock” principle of the law
of armed conflict).
89
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS, reprinted in 16 ILM
1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
90
Michael J. Matheson [then deputy legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State], Remarks, in Sixth Annual
American Red Cross–Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
419, 423, 426 (1987). Various key provisions of Protocol I are repeated verbatim or in substantially similar terms
in regulations and manuals that govern the operations of each of the five services comprised by the U.S. Armed
Forces.
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hostilities, one must know who and what may be attacked. Thus, the initial rule regarding
attacks is that the intended target must be a military objective and that civilians may never be
intentionally targeted (sometimes referred to as the principle of discrimination).91 Second,
once a military objective is identified as the target, the attack may nevertheless be illegal if excessive collateral damage affecting civilians or civilian objects can be expected (the principle of
proportionality).92 Third, even when attacking a lawful target, one must take various additional “precautionary measures” to ensure adherence to proportionality requirements.93
Early multilateral attempts to insert proportionality into international armed conflicts
offered little more than conceptual proclamations that war should be centered on an enemy
state’s military forces.94 The radical reversal, however, in the relative number of civilian to military casualties in World War II served as an impetus for codifying proportionality and related
precautionary measures as legal requisites of the jus in bello.95 The resulting and most widely
accepted definition of proportionality, set forth in Protocol I, prohibits a disproportionate
attack by categorizing it as a special case of indiscrimination. Under this provision, states are
prohibited from undertaking “[any] attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”96
At its core, however, the principle of proportionality still envisions that civilians may be
harmed in the course of attacks against legitimate military objectives. Thus, in spite of modern
human rights norms and its own humanitarian origins, the law of war does not categorically
prohibit states from harming civilians. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of the principle of proportionality and underlying terms such as “excessive” has given military forces considerable discretion in conducting attacks. In practice, the proportionality principle has not protected civilian populations during many armed conflicts spanning the modern era of the law of war. Since
that law was created with the participation of the most powerful states and has historically been
interpreted by those states as a relatively permissive framework, it is not surprising that the
application of the proportionality principle and related rules protecting civilians from hostilities has often been ineffective.97
Yet the proportionality principle is by no means a fiction; nor do states enjoy unfettered discretion in its implementation, particularly since it was codified in Protocol I in 1977. While
in many contexts (such as the field of arms control) the indeterminacy of a legal provision
doubtless undermines its legitimacy and invites unlawful behavior, proportionality has a rich
history as a recognized principle of international law applied in many different areas; through
this frequent application, it can be argued that proportionality has in fact “shed much of its
91

Protocol I, supra note 89, Art. 48. This principle goes beyond prohibiting attacks against purely civilian targets;
it also prohibits attacks that “are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.” Id., Art. 51(4).
92
Articles 51(5)(b) and 57 of Protocol I, supra note 89, summarize the principle of proportionality, although the
term itself does not appear; instead, the word “excessive” is used in relation to civilian casualties.
93
Id., ch. IV.
94
See, e.g., St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 86 (providing that “the only legitimate object which States
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”).
95
Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AJIL 715, 724 (2008).
96
Protocol I, supra note 89, Art. 51(5)(b).
97
See BYERS, supra note 50, at 153 (arguing that “[p]owerful countries have always shaped the international system to their advantage,” including key international legal rules and concepts relating to the use of force).
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indeterminacy” and for this reason has often played an important role in modulating various
types of conflict between states.98 Many variables may explain the widespread usage and continuing “compliance pull” of the proportionality principle, but key factors include the extent
to which it has become an integral part of the thinking and conduct of states, the corresponding
powerful influence it exerts on both judicial and political bodies, and its hold on the “imagination of the epistemic community in which it is used as the prism for viewing, arguing, and
ultimately resolving disputes.”99 Virtual technologies and the new transparency they bring to
military operations are dramatically strengthening this hold in the area of armed conflict by
creating unprecedented opportunities for debating and applying the proportionality principle
to the real world of attacks. As these technologies transform modern military operations and
institutions, they are bringing new life and unheard-of traction to proportionality, reshaping
the related duty to take precautionary measures, removing key factors that have been used by
states to excuse noncompliance, and altering fundamental conditions that have previously limited the observance of key jus in bello obligations.
Virtual Distance: Giving Proportionality Traction
The obligation to refrain from disproportionate attacks often forces military commanders
to make difficult decisions, to weigh the value of innocent human lives in relation to the capture
or destruction of a particular military objective. While the proportionality test is unquestionably applicable to modern military operations—and failure by a commander to comply with
obligations derived from proportionality can constitute a war crime100—the test is much easier
to formulate in principle than to apply to a complex or uncertain set of circumstances. As a
result, military commanders and states have enjoyed a great deal of discretion in making these
evaluations. However, various aspects of the distance of virtual technologies from the battlefield dramatically change factors that previously were critical to such evaluations. This new
“virtual” distance is giving proportionality requirements new significance by eliminating some
of the key excuses that states have long used to escape responsibility for attacks that appear to
cause excessive civilian casualties.
Risk. In examining and reviewing charges that NATO attacks on targets during the 1999
Kosovo conflict were unlawful, a committee established for that purpose within the Office of
the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY
Committee)101 concluded that once it is decided that the proportionality principle applies,
certain key questions must be resolved. These questions include the relative values to be
assigned to the military advantage to be gained and the possible injury to noncombatants
98

Franck, supra note 95, at 718.
Id. at 717.
100
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3.
The necessary mens rea element for such an offense is “knowledge,” which “means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.” Id., Art. 30(3). The required mens rea need not
be an intent to harm civilians but, instead, can be satisfied by a “reckless disregard” of such consequences. YORAM
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 117
(2004).
101
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ( June 8, 2000), reprinted in 39 ILM 1257 (2000) [hereinafter
ICTY Report].
99
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and/or the damage to civilian objects; the information to be included or excluded in totaling
sums; and the “standard of measurement in time or space.”102 As difficult as these first three
questions are, the committee added an important fourth one: “To what extent is a military
commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or
damage to civilian objects?”103 In the context of conventional manned aircraft, exposure is
often linked to the altitude at which aircraft must fly to launch attacks safely and avoid hostile
ground fire.
To what extent a military commander should expose his forces to danger to minimize collateral damage is likely to be seen much differently by a military officer responsible for the
well-being of his troops than by a human rights expert working at a nongovernmental organization. For example, human rights groups criticized the U.S. high-altitude bombing of
Iraqi targets in the 1991Gulf war as having diminished bombing accuracy and unnecessarily
endangering civilians.104 The U.S. Defense Department, however, maintained that coalition
forces had taken many steps to “provide the greatest possible accuracy and the least risk to civilian objects and the civilian population”—but explained that it had taken only those measures
that could be implemented “[t]o the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews.”105
The issue of the greater risks that high-altitude bombing may pose to civilians arose again
during the Kosovo conflict when human rights groups complained that NATO gave priority
to protecting its pilots rather than civilians.106 In addressing these charges, the ICTY Committee noted that “NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives,” but nonetheless found that
there was “nothing inherently unlawful about flying above the height which can be reached by
enemy air defences.”107 While noting that the fifteen-thousand-foot minimum altitude
adopted by NATO for a significant part of its air campaign meant that a target “could not be
verified with the naked eye,” the committee believed that modern technology allowed NATO
to meet its obligation to distinguish “in the vast majority of cases during the bombing campaign.”108 Even though the safety of aircrews remains a compelling objective, such reasoning
has enabled states with high-altitude bombing capabilities to avoid a fuller application of proportionality requirements to many of their aerial bombing operations.
One incident investigated by the ICTY Committee and described as “problematic” demonstrates both the continuing problem of distance in conventional air strikes and the potentially transformational effects of virtual distance. On April 14, 1999, NATO aircraft launched
an attack on a convoy of vehicles traveling along the Djakovica-Prizren road in Kosovo. While
102

Id., para. 49.
Id.
104
Middle East Watch further noted that since over 90 percent of the bombs dropped in the Gulf war were
“dumb” or unguided bombs, high-altitude bombing clearly increased the risks of civilian casualties, citing as proof
the statement to that effect by former undersecretary of defense for research and engineering William J. Perry.
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 29, at 116.
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See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War—Appendix on the Role
of the Law of War (Apr. 10, 1992), reprinted in 31 ILM 612, 622 (1992) (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Kosovo: Amnesty International Concerns Relating to NATO Bombings, AI Index EUR
70/069/1999, May 18, 1999.
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some of the details of the Djakovica incident remain unclear and initial accounts were confusing, NATO planes apparently mistook tractors and other civilian vehicles in the convoy for
military equipment and struck what turned out to be a group of Kosovar Albanian refugees,
killing at least seventy civilians.109 NATO officials admitted having attacked civilian vehicles
but argued that “when viewed with the naked eye from the attack altitude they appeared to be
military vehicles.”110
The ICTY Committee repeated that there was “nothing unlawful about operating at a
height above Yugoslav air defences” but acknowledged that “it is difficult for any aircrew operating an aircraft flying at several hundred miles an hour and at a substantial height to distinguish between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy.”111 Unable to conclude that the
NATO commanders and pilots involved in the Djakovica incident had displayed a degree of
recklessness that would sustain war crimes charges, the committee reinforced the centrality of
conventional notions of distance and risk to proportionality by conceding that “this incident
is one where it appears the aircrews could have benefitted from lower altitude scrutiny of the
target at an early stage.”112
UAVs and other virtual technologies, which were used only on a limited or experimental
basis during the Kosovo conflict, now increasingly enable military commanders to eliminate
the exposure of aircrews to the risks of low-altitude missions, as well as the exposure of some
ground forces to the danger of combat. The elimination of this fundamental tactical problem
not only removes a key excuse that has often been used by states to limit the application of
the principle of proportionality, but also dramatically affects what is “feasible” under the obligation in Protocol I to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack.”113
Environment. A military commander will naturally be concerned about exposing his forces
to hostile fire in efforts to avoid civilian casualties during an attack. The immediate, personal
concerns of the combat troops themselves may be expressed in such maxims as: “If the enemy
is in range, so are you!” Fear of death or injury on the battlefield—as well as stress, anger, and
revenge—can clearly cloud a person’s judgment in ways detrimental to compliance with lawof-war obligations toward noncombatants.114 This most fundamental distance problem—
proximity to the terrible personal costs and stress of combat—is clearly a critical, limiting environmental factor that virtual technology radically alters: new virtual operating environments
109
Michael R. Gordon, Crisis in the Balkans: A NATO Account; NATO Admits Pilot Bombed 2d Convoy on Kosovo
Road, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at A12 (responding to Serbian claims that seventy-four civilians were killed in
this incident, NATO officials said their pilots, flying at high altitude, had been convinced they were striking only
military vehicles).
110
ICTY Report, supra note 101, para. 67 (emphasis added).
111
Id., para. 69.
112
Id., para. 70.
113
Protocol I, supra note 89, Art. 57(2)(a)(ii). Human rights groups argued that “inadequate precautions were
taken to avoid civilian casualties” by NATO in the Djakovica incident because “higher altitude seems to have
impeded a pilot from adequately identifying a target.” See, e.g., CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN,
12 HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO. 1(D), Feb. 2000, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm.
114
See, e.g., U.S. Army, Office of the Surgeon General, Mental Health Advisory Team IV, Final Report 4
(Nov. 17, 2006), available at http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/reports/mhat/mhat_iv/MHAT_IV_Report_
17NOV06.pdf (finding, inter alia, that soldiers in Iraq who were angry, stressed, or anxious were more likely to
report that they had mistreated noncombatants).
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can free both commanders and their troops from many of the negative effects that the battlefield may have on attempts to prevent unnecessary harm to civilians.115
In addition to emotional and psychological factors, the responsibilities and limitations
associated with the combat environment take a toll on the performance of all aspects of
missions, including the careful and focused efforts that may be required to prevent disproportionate civilian casualties. One significant environmental factor that virtual technologies have radically altered is the multiple tasks confronting pilots when attacking a target
and at the same time attempting to minimize collateral damage. Flying, navigating, targeting, and communicating while evading enemy defenses can be a formidable set of responsibilities, particularly for a single pilot flying aircraft like the F-16 planes involved in the
Djakovica incident. This multiplicity of tasks impressed the ICTY Committee as an important
factor in mitigating pilot responsibility for the extensive civilian casualties resulting from the
attack.116
In the relative calm of an air-conditioned room far removed from the threat of enemy attack,
the persons responsible for operating a UAV (such as a Predator or a Reaper) are required to
perform far fewer tasks than the crew in conventional aircraft, while also benefiting from
enhanced sensors to improve their targeting capabilities.117 Although this virtual technology
creates formidable attack capabilities, it also enhances the ability of the pilot and sensor operator(s) to focus on avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties, creating a new and more suitable environment for compliance with proportionality requirements and other law-of-war
obligations.
Fatigue is another environmental factor that unquestionably affects the performance of
combatants and their ability to comply with law-of-war obligations during attacks. This problem was highlighted in April 2002, when a “friendly fire” attack in Afghanistan by two pilots
in the Illinois Air National Guard resulted in the deaths of four Canadian soldiers. Both pilots
claimed that their judgment had been impaired by “go pills” containing the stimulant dexamphetamine, which had been prescribed to them by the U.S. Air Force as part of a fatigue management program.118 While the duties of personnel operating a UAV in a virtual environment
undoubtedly require great skill and are said to involve many of the same challenges as conventional operational missions, they do not require aircrews to push the limits of their physical
115
In addition to eliminating the fear or hysteria that may lead to the taking of excessive measures in self-defense,
virtual technologies offer humans in remote locations the opportunity to overcome other factors that might contribute to war crimes and the deaths of noncombatants: command-and-control structures are able to remain more
intact; orders may be conveyed more clearly; and human senses augmented by technology may better define the
enemy and battle conditions, helping to counter the phenomenon of “scenario fulfillment,” i.e., a “distortion or
neglect of contradictory information in stressful situations.” RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR: EMBEDDING ETHICS IN A HYBRID DELIBERATIVE/REACTIVE ROBOT ARCHITECTURE 6 (Tech. Rep. GITGVU-07-11), at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/formalizationv35.pdf.
116
ICTY Report, supra note 101, para. 69.
117
See Peter Almond, Joystick Squadron: It’s the RAF’s Newest Combat Group: Pilotless Planes Flown from 8,000
Miles Away, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), July 6, 2008, at 55 (also noting the observations of British UAV pilots
that the “cockpit” of a UAV has “far fewer obvious controls than a manned combat jet and almost none of the expensive electronic defences that protect a manned pilot from missile attack”).
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Frank Main, Guard Pilots Blame Drug in Fatal Bombing, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at 7 (further noting
that “[t]he Air Force says the use of ‘go pill’ is voluntary,” but quoting one of the pilots’ lawyers as saying that “refusal
to take uppers or downers is a career-ending decision”); see also Bruce Rolfsen, Sliding Home; A B-1B Arrives with
Landing Gear Up, A.F. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006.
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endurance or to take stimulants to fight off fatigue. For example, British journalists, reporting
on a new U.S.-based Royal Air Force squadron that operates unmanned British MQ-9 Reapers
over Afghanistan, found the much less fatiguing schedule associated with this virtual environment especially impressive. Noting the reduced stress and healthier routine afforded UAV
pilots assigned to this unit, they observed that “[f]lying has come a long way since the experiences of our Battle of Britain heroes.”119
An incident that dramatically illustrates both the significance of virtual distance and the limiting environmental effects of conventional manned aircraft on efforts to prevent excessive
civilian casualties occurred during the Kosovo conflict on April 12, 1999, when a NATO
F-15E Strike Eagle launched two missiles at a railway bridge over the Grdilca Gorge in Serbia.
Moments before the impact of the first electro-optically guided missile, a passenger train
moved onto the bridge. According to the NATO commander, General Wesley Clark, the missile hit the train even though, at the last moment, the person guiding the bomb “caught a flash
of movement that came into the screen and it was the train coming in. Unfortunately he
couldn’t dump the bomb at that point, it was locked . . . .”120 The aircrew observed that the
bridge was not destroyed but, apparently unaware that the disabled train was sitting on it, fired
a second missile aimed at the other end of the bridge. Sadly, this missile also hit the train, killing
many of the occupants and sparking international outrage. General Clark described the second
missile hit as an “uncanny accident” in which the damaged train, obscured by smoke and
clouds, had slid forward across the bridge and was again sighted too late to allow the missile
to be diverted.121 In the face of mounting international criticism, NATO released a bombcamera video to support its version of events.122
In its review of another of the incidents it described as “problematic,” the ICTY Committee
concluded that the Grdilca bridge was a legitimate military objective, that the F-15 aircrew had
not deliberately targeted the passenger train, and that the person controlling the bombs was
required to target the bridge “over a very short period of time” and had “failed to recognize the
arrival of the train while the first bomb was in flight.”123 While the committee members split
over the legality of the second bombing, they could not conclude that the second attack displayed the necessary element of recklessness for initiating a war crimes investigation.124 It can
be inferred from their conclusions that the civilian casualties caused by this attack were not
excessive and that the firing of the second missile must have involved a serious “human error
in the heat of the moment” that was at least partially explained by the circumstances and con119
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ditions faced by the aircrew.125 Among the conditions the committee appears to have considered significant were the limitations, discussed above, linked to conventional notions of distance and risk, including the need for the aircrew to perform multiple tasks while flying in a
high-speed aircraft and “endeavouring to keep the aircraft in the air and safe from surrounding
threats in a combat environment.”126
NATO further based its justification for the many civilian casualties of the Grdilca bridge
attack on another critical, limiting environmental factor, the inherent spatial limits of a cockpit. Operating at a high altitude, the aircrew could effectively view the target only through the
camera in the electro-optical guidance system of each bomb. In the bomb-camera video of the
attack, which was shown by General Clark in a NATO press briefing, the train is clearly seen
approaching the bridge before the missile hits. However, as General Clark emphasized to the
media, the person launching the missile on the aircraft was dependent on a small five-inch
screen to guide the missile to its target and did not enjoy the benefit of the “much better view”
on the video footage.127 General Clark’s comment implied that a bigger screen and a more
complete picture, like the picture on the monitor available to the crew of a UAV, might have
made a difference in a key aspect of this tragic attack and the ultimate judgment that it fell
within the limits of proportionality.
Unable to see the target with their own eyes because of distance, and unable to get an adequate view of the target by means of the electro-optical guidance system on the bomb because
of the technical limitations of these systems and the spatial limitations of the cockpit, the
aircrew in the Grdilca incident demonstrated why the accuracy of PGMs can unquestionably
be affected by distance when conventional aircraft are involved, notwithstanding remarks to
the contrary by senior Pentagon officials.128 While such limitations figured among those used
to justify the many civilian casualties at the Grdilca bridge, they are radically altered by new
virtual technologies. Had the “unblinking eye” of a UAV been in the vicinity, it could have
provided an invaluable second, extrahuman view of the Grdilca bridge, adding immeasurably
to the obscured and limited view of the aircrew while providing real-time data to UAV operators at a virtual location. Such benefits of virtual surveillance capabilities for the observance
of law-of-war obligations merit more careful evaluation.
Extrahuman Virtual Capabilities
As noted, the principles of distinction and proportionality are easy to state but often difficult
to apply. Article 57 of Protocol I, however, now summarizes the practical application of
these principles in the form of more concrete rules. These rules, which appear to be part of
customary international law129 and are also substantially repeated in several U.S. military
125
A. P. V. Rogers, What Is a Legitimate Military Target? in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF HILAIRE MCCOUBREY 160, 167 (Richard Burchill, Nigel D. White, & Justin Morris eds.,
2005).
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Dr. Perry, the former undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, argued that the accuracy of precisionguided munitions “is independent of the altitude of delivery”).
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manuals,130 require states to take certain “precautionary measures” in attacks. These measures
include doing everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives; choosing means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding or minimizing incidental
injury to civilians and civilian objects; refraining from launching an attack expected to be in
breach of the principle of proportionality; and canceling or suspending an attack if it becomes
apparent that the objective is not a military one or if the attack may be expected to be in breach
of the principle of proportionality.131
The rules found in Article 57 not only limit the discretion of states but also constrain individuals. The personal significance of these obligations for military personnel—in the form of
individual criminal responsibility—is heightened by their broad and explicit application to
“those who plan or decide upon an attack.”132 Article 85 of Protocol I reinforces this burden
on military personnel by providing that launching an indiscriminate attack in violation of the
Article 57 prohibition on contravening the principle of proportionality can constitute a grave
breach.133
The argument has been advanced that proportionality and the duty to take “all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack” include an obligation to use precision
weaponry. Yet “feasible” is a contextual term;134 the text of Protocol I contains no absolute
requirement to use PGMs and no such obligation can be said to be mandated under customary
international law.135 If one considers PGMs in a technological context, such arguments have
largely been overtaken by events: states that possess these weapons often prefer them to less
advantageous and less accurate conventional munitions, for compelling fiscal, policy, and
operational reasons.136
In the new era of virtual surveillance capabilities, a more cogent question about the meaning
of the duty to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack” concerns what is required with respect to the use of information assets in an attack. Virtual technologies have vastly expanded the information resources available to military commanders.
130
See, e.g., NAVY COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 87, para. 8.3.1 (“Naval commanders must take all
reasonable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations, to keep civilian casualties
and damage to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force.”); DEP’T OF
THE AIR FORCE, USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE, paras. A4.3, A4.3.1 (A.F. Pamphlet 14-210, Feb. 1,
1998); U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 87, para. 41; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, at 5-9 to 5-10 (AFP 110-31,
1976, designated obsolete Dec. 20, 1995) (restating the provisions of Protocol I, Article 57 almost verbatim).
131
Protocol I, supra note 89, Art. 57(2)(a)(i), (2)(a)(ii), (2)(a)(iii), & (2)(b).
132
See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, para. 2197 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY] (noting that some states
were even concerned that these words “could lay a heavy burden of responsibility on subordinate officers who are
not always capable of taking such decisions”).
133
Id., para. 2187 (referring to Art. 57(2)(a)(iii)).
134
For example, NATO understands a “feasible” precaution to mean “that which is practicable or practically
possible, taking into account all circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the success of military operations.” ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 405, para. 8.1.2.1 n.18 (Naval War C. Int’l L. Stud. No. 73, A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999).
135
Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445,
461 (2005). For a summary of such arguments, see id.
136
See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., The Bills Come Due, NAT’L J., Mar. 15, 2008, at 18 (“Today almost all bombs
carried by U.S. aircraft are precision-guided.”).
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Although legal precedents in this area are scarce, at least one international tribunal has emphasized the appropriate use of available information as a key factor in determining individual
criminal responsibility for disproportionate attacks.137 The practical availability of so much
new information also bears heavily on a commander’s responsibility to minimize incidental
civilian casualties under current U.S. military regulations.138
As indicated above, new strategies that require “persistent surveillance” also entail everexpanding operational access at all levels of command to the new information resources.
Because of these new technologies, strategies, and policies, what was previously not legally
feasible is being radically altered by what is now operationally required. Thus, the legal, contextual constraints of feasibility that until recently allowed a U.S. military commander to argue
that his or her obligation to deploy and use advanced ISR technologies was limited are being
fundamentally changed by virtual technologies.139
In an effort to comply with the obligation under Article 57(2) of Protocol I to “do everything
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects” and
otherwise seek to prevent disproportionate civilian casualties, the U.S. military engages in an
elaborate “collateral damage assessment” process in planning attacks. Such assessments often
rely, at least in part, on computer programs that can more precisely model the potential civilian
damage to be anticipated from a planned attack.140 These programs calculate effects based
on several factors, such as the size and type of the bomb to be used, the type of aircraft launching
or dropping it, and the altitude at which the plane will fly. Since targeting decisions cannot,
however, be totally abdicated to computers, commanders can and do authorize attacks that are
not based solely on the results of computer-generated models.
Collateral damage assessment usually involves the active participation of lawyers.141 While
careful calculations and the meaningful involvement of competent legal counsel are necessary
components of this process, the key to meaningful assessments is accurate intelligence—and
its lack is the most common reason for their insufficiency.142 Since targeting itself is essentially
137
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galić, No. IT-98-29-T, para. 58 (Dec. 5, 2003) (noting that in making such a determination, “it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian
casualties to result from the attack”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
138
See, e.g., NAVY COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 87, para. 8.1.2 (noting that “the commander must
determine whether the anticipated incidental injuries and collateral damage would be excessive, on the basis of an
honest and reasonable estimate of the facts available to him,” and whether alternative possible methods of attack
should be chosen to reduce civilian casualties and damage “in light of all the facts known or reasonably available
to him”) (emphasis added).
139
Schmitt, supra note 135, at 461 (noting such “decisional factors” as time constraints on the ability to gather
and process additional information, calculation of the extent to which such information would resolve uncertainties, competing demands on ISR resources, and risks to the systems and operators). These decisional factors are being
reshaped by new virtual “persistent surveillance” capabilities, network-centric access to related ISR data throughout
the command structure, the improving quality and types of information collected by virtual platforms (especially
real-time data), and the complete lack of risk involved in the collection of information through these virtual systems.
140
Bradley Graham, Military Turns to Software to Cut Civilian Casualties, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2003, at A18.
(The military admits that this computer program originally bore the unfortunate name “Bugsplat” but was later
renamed “FAST-CD” or “Fast Assessment Strike Tool—Collateral Damage.”)
141
See generally Dunlap, supra note 44.
142
Benjamin, supra note 61 (quoting the deputy director of the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center in
Qatar—the command hub responsible for air operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan—as saying that when immediate air support is requested and only limited information is available on the location of vulnerable civilians, “that
is where you see most of the civilians being killed”).
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an intelligence function, commanders who are obligated to take precautionary measures to
ensure distinction and proportionality in an attack also by implication are responsible for
ensuring that, to the fullest of their abilities and to the extent “feasible,” accurate intelligence
is properly used in assessments of potential civilian damage. As the ICTY Committee observed,
“The obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military commander must
set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and evaluate information concerning
potential targets. The commander must also direct his forces to use available technical means
to properly identify targets during operations.”143 It follows from this reasoning that new
virtual information resources that vastly increase the “available technical means to properly
identify targets during operations” directly affect the individual responsibility of military
commanders to take all feasible measures to verify military objectives and avoid excessive civilian casualties. Moreover, the committee’s observations on a commander’s duty under the law
of war to set up and use appropriate intelligence-gathering mechanisms to verify military targets usefully illustrate the increasing willingness of international tribunals to apply the proportionality principle and related rules to difficult combat decisions.144 The committee’s work in
this case further shows how video records of incidents, an information resource that has been
radically improved and expanded by virtual surveillance capabilities, help open the door to
“second opinions” about the lawfulness of specific military actions in a process that continues
to increase the currency of the proportionality principle in resolving disputes.145
Because many new attack capabilities are inseparably linked to virtual information
resources, virtual technologies are reshaping legal obligations related to overall attack planning.
The potential impact of this new universe of information, especially on the duty to verify targets as military objectives, can be seen in the controversy over the U.S. air strike on the Al Firdos
bunker in Baghdad on February 13, 1991.146 This attack, which caused the greatest loss of civilian life of any single incident during the Gulf war, was described as a “pivotal moment” in the
way the U.S. military approached targeting issues and an example of the “intersection of high
technology and bad publicity.”147 Although the Iraqis had originally built the bunker to serve
as an air raid shelter, the United States received intelligence that it had been converted into a
headquarters for the Baath Party’s secret police. Tragically, in addition to Iraqi intelligence
operatives, many families had also relocated to the bunker, accounting for the subsequent
deaths of approximately three hundred civilians, including over one hundred children.
143
ICTY Report, supra note 101, para. 29. While the committee noted that “[b]oth the commander and the
aircrew actually engaged in operations must have some range of discretion to determine which available resources
shall be used and how they shall be used,” the report predates large-scale deployment of UAVs and availability of
related information resources. Id.
144
Franck, supra note 95, at 736 (noting how the ICTY Report “sustains the conclusion that . . . it is perfectly
possible to apply the principle of proportionality to combat decisions and render a plausible second opinion”).
145
Id. at 717 (arguing that some powerful, yet indeterminate, legal principles, such as proportionality, achieve
success in helping to resolve disputes by “deliberately creating a space for ‘second opinions’ to which claims of disputants can be referred”).
146
See Michael W. Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AJIL 481, 504 (2003).
147
Benjamin, supra note 61 (noting that events like the Al Firdos bunker incident “gave birth to a modern military bureaucracy that could analyze and approve airstrikes based, in part, on anticipated civilian casualties”). Some
military officers did not view the birth of this new bureaucracy favorably. See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High
Ground, 56 A.F. L. REV. 1, 34 (2005) (“[T]he al-Firdos bunker incident was a turning point, creating a preoccupation to minimize civilian casualties and any other collateral damage.”).
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The attack on the Al Firdos bunker was widely criticized. Some human rights groups suggested that the United States knew—or in any event should have known—that civilians had
taken shelter in the bunker, and that the U.S. military was thus obligated to inform Iraq of
its change in status from an air raid shelter to a military target.148 U.S. officials emphasized,
however, that their limited ISR capabilities were not able to establish that civilians were entering the bunker each night.149 Information to that effect could have profoundly affected
the decision to attack the bunker and today could be obtained through persistent surveillance
by UAVs.150
If the United States could have reviewed images or other information indicating the presence of many civilians before the Al Firdos attack, U.S. commanders presumably would not
have launched the operation—provided that the information helped them conclude that the
expected significant loss of civilian life was indeed excessive in relation to the limited concrete
and direct military advantage to be gained from destroying the bunker.151 One can easily
understand how access to more information could have changed collateral damage assessments
like the one involving the Al Firdos bunker, but that conclusion assumes that critical information would have reached the appropriate decision makers in a timely fashion. As noted,
however, the hierarchical, linear bureaucracies of large military organizations are not optimally
organized to make use of large amounts of recent or real-time information. Such failings may
in fact have played a part in the Al Firdos attack, since at least one U.S. official has suggested
that even with its limited surveillance capabilities, the military was overloaded with relevant
intelligence data.152 This potential excuse or justification, however, for not using critical, available information to do “everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects” is losing force, as discussed above, because of the organizational changes required to support the operational applications of the ubiquitous information
generated by persistent surveillance.
As virtual surveillance capabilities inescapably change both what is required for military
operations and what is feasible as precautionary measures, lawyers will be key to improving
access to the new information resources pertaining to the legal sufficiency of collateral
damage assessments. Lawyers will be compelled to demand all available data relevant to their
review of attacks that risk incidental civilian casualties, including prolonged imagery of targets
that might show the presence of civilians. If such data are lacking despite the use of persistent
surveillance, these lawyers (and afterward the critical media, interested nongovernmental
148

MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 29, at 128 – 47.
R. Jeffrey Smith, Building Was Targeted Months Ago as Shelter for Leaders, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1991,
at A25.
150
See Lewis, supra note 146, at 504 (arguing that the contention that the United States had, or should have had,
prior knowledge that civilians were in the Al Firdos bunker seems “flawed” because of inadequate intelligence
resources: he notes that less than 3 percent of the total sorties flown during Operation Desert Storm were reconnaissance sorties and that “much-celebrated reconnaissance platforms such as the Predator and Global Hawk drones
lay ten years in the future”).
151
A CENTCOM staff officer responsible for planning the attack was quoted as saying that “had we known that
there were civilians in the bunker, it never would have been attacked.” Id. at 503. Such sentiments, however, were
viewed with skepticism by those who saw the U.S. campaign as being built upon a willingness to accept high civilian
casualties. See Normand & Jochnick, supra note 26, at 402.
152
Smith, supra note 149 (quoting a U.S. official as saying that “[w]e get a lot more intelligence data than we
have time to look at,” and observing that “there are literally thousands of targets worth looking at. It’s hardly surprising that we didn’t look at this the day before the raid.”).
149
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organizations, opportunistic adversaries, and a host of others with potential “second opinions”) are likely to ask why such information was not collected or made available.
In addition to its role in preplanned strikes, information gained by virtual technologies is
likely to have a profound impact on the duty of a commander under Article 57(2)(b) of
Protocol I to terminate an ongoing attack when its continuance would appear to breach the
principle of proportionality. Two examples from the Kosovo conflict help illustrate the point,
though the necessary surveillance capability was not available at the time. First, in the case of
the Grdilca bridge in Serbia, the crew members of the attacking aircraft did not abort the
second attack because their already-limited visibility, which was further obscured by smoke,
prevented them from seeing that the passenger train was still on the bridge. A virtual platform
providing additional views and a longer loiter time would probably have proven invaluable in
better surveilling the bridge with the stranded train still on it. Second, in the case of the convoy
of civilian vehicles near Djakovica, the tragedy was compounded by the execution of a series
of air strikes by several different planes that lasted over two hours. While the initial mistaken
identification of military vehicles in the convoy raised one set of questions, the failure to suspend the attack in the face of mounting civilian casualties raised another. After allied officers
at a NATO command center in Italy became concerned that the convoy did not appear to
be traveling in a manner typical of Serbian military units, special observation planes were dispatched and pilots with binoculars identified civilian vehicles on the road.153 Only then was
the attack halted.
Even as virtual technologies enhance the surveillance capabilities of military personnel, they
also make the military’s own activities more perceptible before, during, and after attacks. Those
who plan or decide upon an attack will increasingly do so with the knowledge that a much more
complete record is being created of both their actions and the basis for their decisions. The new
real-time data may give this record far more relevance than ever before in establishing a failure
to suspend an ongoing attack that is causing disproportionate harm. With respect to the duty
to take precautionary measures in the planning of attacks, this unprecedented level of transparency creates a record that can later be used to evaluate key elements of the collateral damage
assessments, thus improving accountability by making the proportionality requirement more
difficult to ignore and noncompliance more difficult to conceal.
Persistent surveillance through virtual technologies is also leading to unexpected and somewhat ironic changes in the inherently subjective risk assessment process itself. Although modern guided weapons are far more accurate than the iron bombs of World War II, a precision
bombing attack in the virtual era may nevertheless entail a tragic certainty of death for a specific
number of civilians located near the targeted military objective. Persistent surveillance may
now enable attack planners to make much more precise estimates of how many civilians are
likely to die in a particular strike. The perverse consequence of this new capability, not unnoticed by some human rights groups, is that civilian deaths in such attacks may be incidental but
no longer are accidental.154 The calculations associated with this new technological capability
have reportedly become ever more exacting for military and government leaders as they grapple
153

Gordon, supra note 109.
Benjamin, supra note 61 (quoting Sarah Holewinski, executive director of the Campaign for Innocent
Victims in Conflict, who observes of the decision to bomb targets with a certain number of likely civilian casualties:
“They call them accidental deaths, but they are not . . . . They know what they are doing.”).
154
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with the maximum allowable number of anticipated civilian casualties from a given planned
attack.155
The grim math of collateral damage assessments in the virtual era may at first seem repugnant, but it also means that those planning attacks cannot easily escape the reality of their likely
human cost. This painful reality, however, is exactly the right starting point for required evaluations under the proportionality principle. The difficult balancing of humanity and military
necessity that lies at the heart of the proportionality principle is thus being made more authentic by the unintended, virtually created new level of transparency.
The Fusion of Human and Machine
In addition to the possibility of human error that characterizes many apparent failures to
take precautionary measures, states have drawn on the failings of machines, using expressions
such as “technical malfunctions” to describe seemingly unavoidable causes of many unintended civilian casualties. This excuse, though often advanced by states in the permissive lawof-war framework, is undergoing intense pressure from a more technologically sophisticated,
humanitarian-oriented, and highly watchful international community. This pressure is
increased with each ill-advised statement by a government official exaggerating the accuracy
of so-called smart bombs.156
The spectrum of excuses for errant bombings—including technical malfunctions, unavoidable accidents, and more avoidable human errors—highlights a fundamental problem stemming from advanced military weapons systems, especially virtual technologies: the increasing
fusion of humans and machines in war. The combined functioning of man and machine that
many advanced weapons systems require unfortunately does not eliminate the possibility of
“accidental” civilian casualties. It does, however, increasingly blur the distinction between
technical malfunction and human error. On one level, technology aids human operators of
sophisticated weapons systems to such an extent that their own senses become partially
mechanical. For example, the eyes of pilots who fly helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft at night
by means of night-vision equipment function exclusively through a mechanical spectrum, one
155
Bradley Graham, U.S. Moved Early for Air Supremacy; Airstrikes on Iraqi Defenses Began Long Before Invasion,
General Says, WASH. POST, July 20, 2003, at A26 (noting that the former commander, U.S. Central Command
Air Forces, confirmed that in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, approval to bomb targets if the deaths
of thirty or more civilians might result had to be reserved for Secretary Rumsfeld, and that “[a]bout 40 or 50 targets
fell in this category”). While the current limit on potential civilian casualties remains classified, a journalist who has
interviewed intelligence analysts familiar with the policy notes that “[t]he days of the ‘magic number’ of 30 are over.”
Benjamin, supra note 61.
156
PGMs are, of course, guided rather than smart, and a significant percentage of them fails to hit their targets.
See Hunter Keeter, Pentagon Estimates 70 Percent PGM Use in Possible War with Iraq, DEFENSE DAILY, Mar. 6,
2003 (quoting a U.S. Central Command official that a failure rate “between 8 percent and 10 percent” can be
expected for PGMs). This failure rate is based on how many PGMs fall “outside the usually-expected 21-foot circular error probable (CEP) associated with precision strikes.” Id. The Department of Defense defines “CEP” as “the
radius of a circle within which half of a missile’s projectiles are expected to fall.” DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 55. A long list of things can go wrong in modern aerial bombing missions, including mechanical or electronic malfunctions in navigation, flight control, guidance, or bomb release systems; changes
in wind direction; severe atmospheric conditions that degrade visibility and the effectiveness of lasers; fluctuations
in global positioning signals; failure of electronic packages on smart bombs, turning them into dumb bombs; and
the falling of bombs from their racks in planes. See Michael Evans, Smart Bombs Can Be Stupid, TIMES (London),
Oct. 25, 2001; Editorial, How Precise Is Our Bombing? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at A12.
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that produces an enhanced-intensity range, as well as an enhanced spectral range that allows
them to take advantage of nonvisible sources of electromagnetic radiation.
On another level, a key aspect of the merging of humans and military machines is seen in
the growing number of high-tech weapons systems that depend on the prior programming of
human operators, epitomized by missiles with “fire and forget” technology that seek and identify enemy targets on the basis of preprogrammed data such as global positioning coordinates,
heat signatures, and electronic emissions. When one of these technologies fails, the faulty
component of the system may be hard to identify; yet such failures raise questions about the
human techniques and procedures involved in the targeting process, especially those related to
the maintenance of accurate, accessible databases. This question becomes even more crucial
when civilians are harmed by bombs that hit what military officials later describe as the “wrong
target.”
In the highly publicized case of the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict (for which the United States gave a detailed explanation,
as well as millions of dollars in ex gratia payments to China and Chinese nationals), technical
systems admittedly functioned superbly as a B-2 stealth bomber dropped five two-thousandpound satellite-guided JDAM ( Joint Direct Attack Munition) bombs on a target that corresponded with preprogrammed global positioning coordinates.157 Unfortunately, the CIA had
supplied coordinates for a purported Yugoslav arms agency that turned out to be those of the
Chinese Embassy. Declaring that the human aircrews “had no idea they were . . . bombing the
Chinese Embassy,” the United States identified a series of “errors and omissions” that led to
this disaster.158 In response to intense criticism, U.S. officials made some important statements
pertaining to responsibility for future failures of sophisticated weapons systems that are especially relevant to law-of-war obligations in the new virtual era. Reaffirming that the bombing
was a mistake, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre observed:
Human beings will always make mistakes. . . . Where human failings are unintentional
and purely accidental, . . . we need to look at the systems and processes we impose to
guide and constrain individuals. Where did our systems and procedures fail? Do our
systems and procedures allow too many human failings which can result in tragic
outcomes?159
Secretary Hamre’s admonition that, when high-tech attacks lead to tragic outcomes, the
U.S. government must take responsibility for the overall systems and procedures on which
modern weapons rely relates directly to the U.S. obligation to take precautionary measures
under the law of war in the new virtual era. In view of the growing scrutiny of international
society, the apparent failure of modern, complex weapons systems to be used in accordance
with the principles of discrimination and proportionality can no longer be easily dismissed on
157

See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 94 AJIL 127–31 (2000).
Thomas Pickering [under secretary of state], Oral Presentation to the Chinese Government Regarding the
Accidental Bombing of the P.R.C. Embassy in Belgrade ( June 17, 1999), at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/6524.doc (noting that these “errors and omissions” included a “severely flawed” technique that was
used to locate the target, databases that did not contain the correct location of the Chinese Embassy, and a target
review process that failed to catch either of these two fundamental errors).
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Inadvertent Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, May 7, 1999: Hearing Before the
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. ( July 22, 1999) (statement of John J. Hamre, deputy
secretary of defense), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test99-7-22hamre.rtf [hereinafter Hamre
Statement].
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the basis of technical malfunctions or the unchecked operation of human failings. The combination of distant human operators and powerful remotely controlled and semiautomated
weapons raises fundamental questions about the procedures and systems needed to support the
programming and operation of these weapons for both operational and legal purposes.
Intelligence systems and resources are critical to the basic functions of virtual technologies
and the improved targeting capabilities that they are intended to make possible. After the debacle of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, U.S. officials conceded that the information and systems supporting new precision-targeting capabilities must at least be free of
obsolete databases and “severely flawed” techniques.160 Consequently, in the context of sophisticated virtual weaponry, feasible precautionary measures include more than just efforts to
ensure access to accurate ISR data as part of the targeting process: systems and procedures
must be established that better ensure the proper combined functioning of man and machine,
that better “guide and constrain individuals” responsible for their operation. This goal
amounts to more than evolving, good policy guidance: it increasingly appears to be part of an
obligation, as reflected in Secretary Hamre’s recognition of fundamental U.S. responsibilities
related to new, sophisticated weapons technologies.161
In the new virtual era, the responsibilities of military forces vis-à-vis the civilian population
before a “fire and forget” weapon is launched call for a reexamination of the obligation to verify
military targets and the duty to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods
of attack. The scrutiny related to the former can now be said to extend beyond the narrow conventional weapons-based focus on which armaments or tactics are suited to a given attack. It
must include an assessment of the key methods, procedures, and systems necessary to support
the effective use of the virtual technologies to be deployed, including a careful evaluation of
whether appropriate efforts are being made to ensure that databases are sufficiently accurate
to catch mistakes by the human operators.162 This is the new “virtual” basis required for
precautionary measures.
Even before the duty to take precautionary measures in attacks was codified in Protocol I,
commentators understood that the evaluation of information for long-distance attacks
obtained from aerial reconnaissance “must include a serious check of its accuracy.”163 In one
sense, as noted above, a modern, serious check for accuracy of targeting information appears
to involve ensuring that virtual surveillance assets are used to confirm military objectives as part
160

Pickering, supra note 158.
Hamre Statement, supra note 159 (acknowledging that “I and my colleagues at DoD are absolutely responsible for the systems and procedures” and promising that “[i]f those systems and procedures permit failure or exacerbate honest error, we are absolutely responsible for fixing them”). While the ICTY Committee concluded that
this incident resulted from “inadequacy of the supporting data bases” and flawed review procedures, it also took note
of the U.S. apology, U.S. payments to China, reprimands of several U.S. officials, and the statements of Secretary
Hamre and others, stressing that “[t]he US Government also claims to have taken corrective actions in order to
assign individual responsibility and to prevent mistakes such as this from occurring in the future.” ICTY Report, supra
note 101, paras. 83, 84 (emphasis added).
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As noted by Secretary Hamre:
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Fifty years ago we knew we couldn’t discriminate between embassies and legitimate targets in a bombing
campaign so we warned everyone accordingly and pressed ahead. We can’t do that today and don’t need to
do that today. But that means we have to have data bases that are sufficiently accurate to catch mistakes that will
be made.
Hamre Statement, supra note 159 (emphasis added).
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ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 132, para. 2195.
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of “available technical means.” In another sense, however, the ability of military forces to count
on any new types of information in evaluating the likelihood of excessive casualties will often
hinge on the inclusion of that information in accessible databases—and it is now these databases themselves that must be checked for accuracy. For this reason, the public acknowledgment by U.S. leaders of their responsibility for maintaining updated, accurate databases to
support high-tech weapons (that often depend on data generated by vast new virtual ISR capabilities) points to the emergence of a new type of obligatory precautionary measure. Such an
obligation seems all the more essential and appropriate since the recent network-centric
reforms in military organizations inspired by the operational utility of the information
acquired through virtual technologies may make useful databases more accessible for proportionality assessments than ever before.
Accurate databases, increasingly full of vital information, are not an exotic, unusual, or burdensome safeguard that must be attached to military missions: they are an operational requirement related to successful targeting and the accomplishment of other mission objectives. Thus,
maintaining accurate databases must be regarded as a minimal “feasible” precaution for the
purposes of verifying objectives to be attacked and otherwise ensuring the proportionality of
attacks in the virtual era. Failure to take this precaution in planning an attack that hits “the
wrong target” will be difficult to defend in the context of increasing technological capabilities,
a commitment to avoiding such mistakes, and an admitted higher duty of care. Noting with
regret that the U.S. “no strike” system had not been adequate to prevent the mistaken attack
on the Chinese Embassy because it had been “dependent on data bases which [were] not
adequately updated,” Secretary Hamre alluded to these ever-higher standards of care when he
concluded that “the challenge lies in ensuring that the underlying data bases on which the
system depends contain, to the maximum extent feasible, the most up-to-date information
available.”164
IV. CONCLUSION
Virtual military technologies are taking law, war, and military institutions on an uncharted
path into the future at breakneck speed. Some of the transformational effects of these new
weapons systems are clear; others are still emerging. One undeniable fact is that remotely
controlled and semiautomated weapons systems are continuing to assume new, important
roles in military operations in more and more countries throughout the world. Furthermore, the absence of humans as the actual combatants in armed conflicts seems to be steadily
achieving acceptance and entering society’s collective consciousness with relatively little reflection. Remotely controlled machines— or “virtual combatants”—are systematically replacing
human combatants, paving the way for armed conflicts in which humans will increasingly be
absent from the battlefield and many dangerous war-fighting missions.165 At some point, the
replacement of humans by virtual combatants and the corresponding lack of concern about
the death or capture of military personnel could even challenge two conditions seen by some
164

Hamre Statement, supra note 159 (emphasis added).
Lopez, supra note 20, at 30 (noting that in addition to using robots to find and disable roadside bombs, the
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as limiting the willingness of states to comply fully with and enforce their law-of-war obligations in conflicts with terrorists: reciprocity and symmetry.166 While states will always have
humanitarian, political, strategic, and military reasons to comply with law-of-war obligations
even if terrorists can be expected to ignore them, eliminating the need for reciprocity and
symmetry could nonetheless contribute to relieving pressure on states to pursue harsher measures against terrorists and other militant groups outside the law-of-war framework.
The movement toward virtual combatants does not come without risks or dangers. The
long-term and understudied consequences of replacing human combatants with virtual
ones raises fundamental questions in many fields. One problematic area, which lies beyond
the scope of this article, concerns the overall consequences of this phenomenon for the jus
ad bellum, or international law governing recourse to war. Inasmuch as technological developments reduce the political costs of going to war by eliminating the risk that human operators
will be killed or captured, some commentators fear that those developments will make it easier
and more attractive for states to become involved in armed conflicts.167
The power of virtual technologies to improve the observance of the jus in bello gives rise to
the contrasting concern that these technologies remain dependent on the competence of
human operators. Who is to be entrusted with operating virtual weapons systems and how
will those persons be affected by these technologies? Although it remains to be seen whether
virtual technologies will create an elite class of techno-warriors, states will certainly have to
focus on at least one key factor for future operators of these systems: aptitude. An increasingly
high-tech U.S. Army already needs soldiers with a high degree of aptitude. A 2005 study by
the Rand Corporation commissioned by the Pentagon evaluated a variety of factors affecting
military performance; it found aptitude to be critical and concluded that it becomes even more
important as tasks become more technical.168
The implications of the emerging robotic military model for human staffing, recruiting,
and training requirements are complex and far-reaching. In shifting from a model in which the
primary purpose of technology was to support human combatants to a model in which the role
of humans is to support the technology, the robotic military will necessarily demand greater
levels of technical competence from the human “robotists.” As these demands for greater
competence proliferate and virtual technologies merge humans and machines even more
166
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closely, each component of these new virtual weapons systems, along with the sum of their
parts, will continue to be scrutinized. It is in this context and on this basis that law-of-war
obligations in the virtual era will be assessed.
The virtual era is rapidly expanding to encompass the entire international community. The
demand for UAVs, for example, is soaring as more and more countries, including many in the
developing world, are obtaining and becoming familiar with virtual technologies and their ISR
capabilities, in part because UAV systems cost much less than their manned counterparts.169
The acquisition by many countries of UAVs manufactured in the United States, France, and
Germany; by Georgia and India of UAVs manufactured in Israel; and by Pakistan and Egypt
of UAVs manufactured in China demonstrates that the implications of the virtual era already
extend far beyond U.S. military operations alone.170 This growing worldwide familiarity with
UAVs, even if some countries use them only for basic reconnaissance or artillery-spotting missions, will inescapably direct more attention in the future to the improving ability of military
forces, especially those belonging to states that can afford to deploy many advanced systems,
to verify objectives and take other precautionary measures to ensure observance of the proportionality principle in attacks.
Virtual technologies are thus on the verge of significantly shaping the views and conduct of
all states, even those that do not possess them or cannot afford to deploy them in great numbers.
New, extensive virtual surveillance capabilities come with new burdens for the states that benefit from them— burdens that are more and more likely to be invoked by poor or other less
technologically advanced states in any discussion about the corresponding legal duties. The
developed states that seek to avoid these burdens may again find themselves haunted by the new
legal content of words such as “available.” Once relied upon as permissive terms, these words
may now unexpectedly impose constraints. For example, at the diplomatic conference that
ultimately adopted Protocol I, one state observed that the obligation to identify military objectives as targets under Article 57(2) “depended to a large extent on the technical means of detection available to the belligerents.”171 In its Commentary, the International Committee of the
Red Cross agreed, observing that “[s]ome belligerents might have information owing to a modern reconnaissance device, while other belligerents might not have this type of equipment.”172
Drawing on such considerations, less developed states can argue that richer countries with
extensive, widely deployed and sophisticated virtual surveillance capabilities and unprecedented access to once-unimaginable levels of ISR information are subject to a higher standard
of care in verifying targets as military objectives and taking other precautionary measures.
The more exacting legal standards likely to flow from virtual surveillance capabilities will not
be diminished by the global newsroom, which increasingly enhances its reporting with video
169
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footage furnished by virtual platforms overhead. Even the five-day standoff and military action
against Somali pirates holding an American hostage on a small lifeboat in a remote corner of
the Indian Ocean in April 2009 were not exempt from news reports showing video footage
from a UAV used by U.S. forces in the operation.173 When a military operation is not successful
or what actually happened is disputed, no small similarity may be remarked to the instant
replay so familiar to American football fans; although it may lack the assigned referees, the
process involves a close examination of digitally recorded facts, subjects disputed calls to wide
public debate, prompts a more exacting application of rules, and sometimes leads to the refinement of those rules. Similarly, whether the home team likes the call or not, a new era of
openness and debate has arrived, and with it new life for some of the rules on the playing field.
Virtual weapons systems are poised to transform the conditions of future battlefields for
humans and change law, war, and military institutions in profound, far-reaching ways. While
military-technological advances have routinely worsened the plight of civilians in war and
made law an even more distant concern on the battlefield, virtual technologies are unexpectedly
bringing laws that protect civilians closer to war than ever before. These technologies are in fact
giving unprecedented traction, transparency, and relevance to venerable jus in bello rules that
states have often ignored, manipulated, or consigned only to theoretical applications. At the
same time, virtual technologies are refashioning the way military operations are conducted, the
way military institutions function, and the way objectives are defined in war itself. The implications of the dawning virtual era deserve to be more carefully studied across a wide spectrum
of human behavior. For the military institutions that must address the unfolding consequences
of virtual technologies originally designed to help project military power, such a project is in
some respects a study in irony.
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